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Abstract
The three chapters of this thesis contribute to a literature which emphasizes
the importance of microeconomic heterogeneity for macroeconomic outcomes.
In my work I focus on firm heterogeneity. I investigate the US labor market
implications of a drop in the number of new firms, study the cyclical eﬀects on
productivity due to limits in the reallocation of capital across firms, and quan-
tify the eﬀectiveness of a policy which attempted to save jobs in Germany by
altering firm incentives for lay-oﬀs. The first chapter of this thesis investigates
the role of new firms (‘start-ups’) in the US labor market. Start-ups and young
firms grow faster and create more net jobs than older, incumbent firms. Yet
since 2007 the number of start-ups in the US has declined by over 20%, account-
ing for a large part of the persistently high unemployment rate. I claim that
this fact is related to the unprecedented fall in the value of real estate. Based on
the empirical evidence I construct a model that captures the idea that start-ups
require external financing, for which real estate is used as collateral. I calibrate
and compute a quantitative competitive industry model with endogenous entry
and exit, firm heterogeneity, labor adjustment costs, and aggregate shocks. It
generates a ‘jobless recovery’ similar to what we observed in the US in the af-
termath of the 2007-09 recession and is able to explain over 80% of the increase
and persistence in unemployment since the recession. The second chapter, joint
work with Russell Cooper, studies the productivity implications of frictions in
the reallocation of factors. Recent empirical work has shown that misalloca-
tion of factors can have sizeable eﬀects on the levels of aggregate output and
productivity. We are interested in the question whether these frictions can also
produce important cyclical movements. We find that the eﬀects are quantita-
tively important in the presence of fluctuations in adjustment frictions and/or
the cross sectional variation of profitability shocks. These fluctuations depend
on higher order moments of the joint distribution of capital and plant-level pro-
ductivity rather than mean values alone. Even without aggregate productivity
shocks, the model has quantitative properties that resemble those of a standard
stochastic growth model and match important facts about the cyclicality of re-
allocation and firm productivity dispersion. The last chapter, joint work with
Russell Cooper and Moritz Meyer, studies the employment and productivity
implications of short-time work (‘Kurzarbeit’) in Germany. During the years
2009-10 this policy was intended to provide incentives for firms to adjust labor
input by reducing hours per worker instead of firing workers. Using confidential
German firm micro data we estimate a model of costly labor adjustment. We
use the estimated model to simulate the eﬀects of the policy during the recent
recession, trying to quantify in how far the German short-time work scheme
reduced the allocative eﬃciency of the German labor market.
Contents
1 Start-ups, House Prices, and the Jobless Recovery 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.1 Firm Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.2 Housing and Credit supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4.1 Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.4.2 Entrepreneurs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4.3 The Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.4.4 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.4.5 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.5 Computational Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.6 Quantitative Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.6.1 Results of the stationary model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.6.2 Results with Aggregate Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.6.3 Evaluation of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2 Capital Reallocation and Aggregate Productivity 45
2.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.2 Frictionless Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.2.1 Optimal Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.2.2 Aggregate Output and Productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.3 Capital Adjustment Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.3.1 The Planner’s Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.3.2 Joint Distribution of Capital and Productivity . . . . . . . . . 55
2.3.3 Stationary Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.4 Quantitative Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.4.1 Capital Reallocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.4.2 Endogenous Capital Accumulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.4.3 Impulse Response Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.4.4 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.5 Approximation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.5.1 Goodness of Fit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.5.2 Comparison to the RBC Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3 The Employment and Productivity E↵ects of Short-Time Work in
Germany 77
3.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.2 Kurzarbeit in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.2.1 Relation to Existing Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.4.1 Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.4.2 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.4.3 Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.5 Parameterization and Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.5.1 Revenue Function & Productivity Estimation . . . . . . . . . 90
3.5.2 Adjustment Costs Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.6 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.7 Policy Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Chapter 1
Start-ups, House Prices, and the
Jobless Recovery
1.1 Introduction
In this paper I argue that the ‘jobless recovery’ can be explained through lower job
creation by start-ups (firms of age zero). Figure 1-1 shows the result of a simple
counterfactual exercise. Had employment by start-ups and young firms been equal
to its pre-crisis trend, the unemployment rate at the end of 2011 would have been as
low as 6.5% instead of 8.5%. The figure also shows that changes in job destruction
are not driving the jobless recovery. Even with pre-crisis levels of job destruction the
unemployment rate would have been almost as high as we observed.
There has been a renewed interest in jobless recoveries due to the slow recovery
of the US labor market following the Great Recession: Although GDP growth rates
have been positive since the third quarter of 2009, employment has been slow to
follow. Only in the first quarter of 2011 did the unemployment rate fall below its
end-of-recession level.1 In the first quarter of 2013, the unemployment rate stood
at 7.7%, compared to the 4.8% unemployment rate in the last quarter prior to the
recession (Q4 2007). Employment relative to the working age population in mid-2013
was lower than at the height of the financial crisis.
Relatively little is known about who creates - and who destroys - jobs.2 Every
year several hundred thousand new firms are created, providing millions of new jobs.
1Throughout this paper I use the NBER recession dates for my business cycle classifications.
2In an important empirical contributionHaltiwanger et al. (2010) show that by controlling for
firm age there remains no systematic relationship between firm size and growth.
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While not all of those firms succeed, those that do remain strong engines of job
growth over the coming years. This highlights the importance of studying the labor
market’s extraordinary dynamics, resulting from persistent and large heterogeneity
across firms: While some firms expand, others contract, firms are born and firms die.3
At the heart of these dynamics lie start-ups and young firms. Successful start-ups
become vibrant young firms which make up the lion’s share of net job creation. A con-
sequence of the prominent role of start-ups is that whenever the inflow of new firms
into the economy is interrupted this has adverse e↵ects on job creation. The result
can then be a jobless recovery. I will argue that the ‘credit crunch’ and particularly
the fall in house prices associated to the recent economic crisis has created such an
event. Figure 1-2 shows the strong correlation between the number of start-ups and
the house prices index for all US-recession episodes since 1980. The figure plots the
evolution of the HPI and the number of new firms throughout the recession periods.
The goal of this paper is to quantitatively assess the importance of the decline in the
value of real estate - a major funding vehicle for business formation - as a key reason
behind the low number new firms and persistently high unemployment.
To this end I develop a quantitative model of heterogeneous firms that operate in
a frictional labor market. Firms must post vacancies that are filled with endogenous
probability. Wages are determined through bargaining between workers and firms.
Unproductive firms may exit the economy, while new firms can enter. During re-
cessions firms shed workers and post fewer vacancies, generating a Beveridge-curve
relationship between unemployment and vacancies. All agents own a fixed stock of
real estate. Entering firms require a one-period loan to finance start-up costs. They
obtain this loan from a bank and use their real estate as collateral. Because new en-
trepreneurs may strategically default, the risk neutral bank e ciently prices interest
rates by charging a default premium to compensate for expected losses. In this way
changes in the value of collateral feed back to the entry costs of new firms. Adverse
conditions on the housing market can constrain the number of start-ups that enter
during a recovery. This link between house prices and firm entry can explain why job
creation by start-ups decreased before the beginning of the recession in 2007 - a fact
that previous models were unable to address. My model generates jobless recoveries
if low collateral values prevent some start-ups from entering. Since start-ups have
hiring rates over-proportional to their share of output, the link between entry and
real estate breaks the strong co-movement in output and unemployment observed in
3Over the last 35 years the average number of gross jobs created was around 16 million per year,
while 14.4 million jobs per year were destroyed. This respectively corresponds to 17% and 15% of
the entire labor force. In other words, over 30% of the labor force is reallocated in a given year.
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Figure 1-1: The actual unemployment rate is plotted in as the blue solid line. The
remaining lines show the counterfactual unemployment rates for the following exper-
iments: The green dashed line labeled ‘Young Trend’ shows unemployment if gross
job creation by young firms (age 5 or below) had been equal to its pre-2006 HP-trend.
For the red dashdotted line ‘Trend JD’ I set gross job destruction (JD) after 2009
equal to its pre-2006 HP-trend. Source: Census, BLS, own computations
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otherwise similar models. Additional propagation comes through labor adjustment
costs which are chosen to match key moments of the employment change distribution.
1.2 Literature Review
Standard models of the labor market are unable to generate jobless recoveries and
su cient volatility in unemployment and vacancies. The RBC model cannot generate
jobless recoveries because shocks are only to aggregate TFP. After a negative shock the
reversion to the unconditional mean of TFP increases the marginal benefit of all factor
inputs. The Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) search model su↵ers from the same
shortcomings. Furthermore, as pointed out by Shimer (2005) it is unable to generate
the volatility in unemployment and vacancies we observe in the data. The competitive
industry model (Hopenhayn (1992) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), henceforth
(HR)) introduces entry of new firms and therefore appears as a natural starting point
for studying start-ups. The HR setup is a frictionless model in which a market-clearing
wage is found via the free-entry condition. The general equilibrium e↵ects induced
by this condition are quite powerful in this environment, virtually eliminating any
selection e↵ects that could result from the composition of entering and exiting firms
(see e.g. Lee and Mukoyama (2012)). I therefore depart from the basic HR model in
the following respects. First, I add aggregate shocks to the model since I am interested
in the business cycle implications of the model. Second, I add a search-and-matching
framework where firms fill vacancies with endogenous probability. This allows me to
study the implications of the model for unemployment and vacancies and creates a
link between new and incumbent firms through labor market tightness. Third, labor
adjustment costs are added to the model in order to match the employment change
distribution. Finally, I assume that start-ups must borrow the costs of entry. Potential
entrepreneurs use real estate to collateralize a fraction of this loan. As the value of
housing falls, the interest rate new entrepreneurs pay on the loan increases. This
raises their costs of entry and deters some entrepreneurs from entering. Making entry
a function of house prices has several advantages. First, there is empirical evidence on
the sensitivity of young firms’ hiring behavior with respect to conditions on the credit
market. Second, a model with a standard free-entry condition which is not a function
of the house price generates entry rates exhibiting excess volatility with respect to
the data. The additional dependence on a slow-moving process such as the value
of collateral is succesful in generating a realistic volatility of entry. Since the focus
of this paper lies on entry, achieving realistic entry rates is crucial. An important
assumption of my model is that only new firms need to borrow their overhead costs.
4
Figure 1-2: Source: BDS and Cash Shiller Home Price Index. HP-filtered. The x-
axis shows years/quarters since the respective pre-recession quarter (based on NBER
classification).
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This is motivated by results of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) which shows
that real estate and other personal resources are an important source of business
formation, but play a much smaller role for expansions of existing businesses.
My model is then calibrated to match certain cross-sectional data moments, such
as the unemployment-vacancy ratio and the firm age- and employment change dis-
tributions. I estimate firm-level labor adjustment costs via a simulated method of
moments (SMM) approach. The calibrated model can replicate the average life cycle
of firms, the positive correlation between productivity and age, and the negative cor-
relation between employment growth and size observed in the data. I find that the
model with house prices a↵ecting credit conditions significantly outperforms alterna-
tive specifications, particularly because of its ability to generate jobless recoveries.
I perform various policy experiments showing that around 80% of the increase and
persistence in unemployment since the end of 2006 can be explained by a model with
aggregate TFP shocks and changes in the house price index.
This paper contributes to the literature on the role of start-ups over the business
cycle, the impact of financial conditions on the real economy, and jobless recover-
ies. At the basis of the model lies a heterogeneous-firm framework as in HR, to
which I propose the extensions discussed above. An important one is the combina-
tion of heterogeneous firms with a standard Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) search-
and-matching structure. Other papers that have extended the search framework to
multi-worker firms include Cooper et al. (2007), Kaas and Kircher (2011), Elsby and
Michaels (2013), and Acemoglu and Hawkins (2013). In Cooper et al. (2007) labor
adjustment costs are estimated in a heterogeneous firm model with search frictions
but their framework does not allow for entry and exit. Kaas and Kircher (2011)
augment a simplified HR framework with competitive search. Their model can gen-
erate sluggish movements of unemployment following a boom but they rely crucially
on a time-varying entry cost and the convexity of the recruiting cost function. Fur-
thermore, firms in Kaas and Kircher (2011) are ex-ante heterogeneous, while in my
paper they are ex-ante homogeneous and productivity evolves over time. Elsby and
Michaels (2013) introduce the Stole and Zwiebel (1996) bargaining framework to the
multi-worker firm environment but do not study entry.
A second important extension to the HR model is the financing friction for new
businesses. The paper which is most closely related in this respect is Siemer (2013).
Siemer develops a heterogeneous firm model with entry and exit based on Khan and
Thomas (2013) in which all firms borrow through optimal lending contracts with
financial intermediaries. A financial shock overproportionally increases borrowing
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costs for small and young firms and reduces entry. The main di↵erence of my model
is that it generates jobless recoveries, i.e. underproportional employment growth
during recoveries. While in Siemer’s model the financial shock produces a ‘missing
generation’ of entrants, I model a link between the hiring conditions of incumbents
and entrants through the endogenous labor market tightness ✓. This implies that
during a recovery firms benefit from an initially low ✓, which increases hiring and lets
entry rates return relatively quickly to their pre-recession value. In Siemer’s model
the mass of entrants is a 1:1 mapping of the financial shock, implying that entry
levels jump back to their unconditional mean once the financial shock has passed.
In the data, however, we observe that entry rates continued to be at historically
low levels even after financial conditions in the US had returned to “normal”, as
measured e.g. by various financial stress indeces. In my setup I model entry costs as
a function of the value of house prices (collateral). This helps me to explain why entry
rates decreased prior to the recent recession, why they continue to be low relative to
their pre-recession trend, and why job creation by incumbent firms recovered before
job creation by start-ups.4 Other related work focusing on start-ups includes Coles
and Kelishomi (2011), Clementi and Palazzo (2010), and Lee and Mukoyama (2012).
Coles and Kelishomi (2011) study single-worker firms with a two-stage entry process.
They show that thus replacing the free entry condition in the standard matching
framework significantly enhances the aggregate properties of the model. Lee and
Mukoyama (2012) study the cyclical properties of entrants vs. exiters but rely on an
entry cost parameter which is exogenously pro-cyclical. Clementi and Palazzo (2010)
replace the free entry condition of a standard competitive industry model with a
fixed mass of potential entrants and show that entry and exit can propagate the
e↵ects of aggregate shocks.5 Using a standard free-entry condition Hawkins (2011)
finds the opposite result. However, he overstates the cyclicality of entry. To the
best of my knowledge the previous literature on heterogeneous firms has not been
succesful in finding an entry specification that allows for cyclicality in start-up job
creation without misspecifying its cyclicality (see e.g. Clementi and Palazzo (2010),
Hawkins (2011), Lee and Mukoyama (2012), Berger (2012)). The connection between
entry costs and the value of real estate helps to smooth entry rates considerably over
the business cycle and generates a realistic degree of fluctuations. Papers which study
the link between entrepreneurship and housing collateral empirically are Fort et al.
4House Price Indeces such as the All-Transactions House Price Index for the United States by
the FHFA clearly shows a decline prior to the end of 2007. The HPI in Q1 2013 stood at 86% of its
Q4 2007 value.
5Sedlacek (2011) uses a reduced form specification of the free-entry condition to obtain realistic
entry dynamics and reproduce key facts of US firm dynamics.
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(2013) and Schmalz et al. (2013). Fort et al. (2013) estimate a VAR and conclude
that the collapse in housing prices accounts for a significant part of the large decline
in job creation by young firms during the recent recession. Liu et al. (2013a) also find
a signifcant e↵ect of house prices on unemployment. Schmalz et al. (2013) empirically
link house price shocks to entrepreneurial activity and employment in new firms.
Following the seminal publications by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke
et al. (1999) there now exists a vast theoretical literature on the linkages between the
financial sector and the real economy. The impact of credit constraints on macroe-
conomic outcomes has been studied both in the context of search-and-matching and
heterogeneous firm models.6 A large number of theoretical and empirical papers has
found a sizeable e↵ect of credit conditions on the real economy during the recent
recession (see e.g. Jermann and Quadrini (2012), Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012),
and Chodorow-Reich (2013)), but these models do not study entry and exit. In my
model start-ups need to borrow in order to pay the entry costs, making firm entry a
function of credit conditions. A similar mechanism is modeled in Liu et al. (2013b),
where land prices enter a firm’s collateral constraint. As in Chaney et al. (2012) they
find that variations in the collateral value have significant e↵ects on investment.
The jobless recovery has been the topic of Gal´ı et al. (2012), Drautzburg (2013),
Bachmann (2011), and Berger (2012). In Berger’s model firms lay o↵ unproductive
workers during recessions. Di↵erently from my paper, the focus of Berger (2012) is
on the intensive margin of job creation. While my mechanism is otherwise comple-
mentary to Berger’s, I show that introducing financing costs for entrants can not only
generate jobless recoveries, it also significantly contributes to limiting the volatility
of the entry rate. Drautzburg (2013) models an occupational choice problem and es-
timates that approximately one third of the change in start-up job creation following
the recent recession can be attributed to higher risk. Bachmann (2011) explains the
jobless recovery through a combination of adjustment costs which generate a jobless
recovery after a short and shallow recession. For more severe recession episodes such
as the 2008/09 case the model cannot reproduce the observed dynamics, however.
Gal´ı et al. (2012) argue that the 2008/09 downturn only produced a quantitative
change in the relation between GDP and employment. However, by comparing the
trajectories of GDP, unemployment, job destruction, the house price index (HPI),
and start-up job creation for di↵erent recession episodes it becomes clear that series
di↵er substantially compared to the other post-1980 recessions. I show those series in
6Credit constraints in a standard search-and-matching framework were studied by Dromel et al.
(2010) and Petrosky-Nadeau (2013), who find that the presence of constraints can impact both the
level and the persistence of unemployment. Financial constraints have first been introduced into
heterogeneous firm models by Midrigan and Xu (2014), Khan and Thomas (2013) and Siemer (2013).
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Figures -9 and -10 in Appendix A.1. In particular the link between the HPI and start-
up activity (Figure 1-2) stands out as a particular feature of the 2009/09 recession,
as the next section shows.
1.3 Facts
This section presents some stylized facts about job destruction and job creation, en-
terprise dynamics, firm survival, and the link between credit conditions and start-ups.
Throughout this paper I will refer to firms of age zero as start-ups or entrants, while
firms aged one to five years will be referred to as young firms. A start-up is defined as
a new firm, not as a new establishment. Unless otherwise noted the data comes from
the US Census’ Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) database. Details regarding all
the data used in this paper can be found in the Data Appendix. Robustness checks
and additional information about the stylized facts can also be found in the appendix.
1.3.1 Firm Dynamics
The 2008/09 recession produced the largest drop in employment since the beginning
of the Census’ BDS database in 1977. This was the result of both an increase in gross
job destruction and a decrease in gross job creation. Persistently low job creation
rates are what made the recovery ‘jobless’. In 2008/09 fewer jobs were destroyed
than during the 2001 recession.7 Most of it took place on the intensive margin, that
is through downsizings of existing firms. Firm deaths only contributed to around 18%
of all gross job destruction since 2008.8 On the other hand, the years 2008 and 2009
marked the largest decreases in gross job creation in the entire Census data. This
is summarized in the first Stylized Fact. It is robust to employing alternative data
sources as I show in the appendix.
Stylized Fact 1: The Great Recession was mainly a crisis of low job
creation.
Start-ups play a crucial role for the US economy. The main reason for this is
their contribution to job creation. While start-ups create around three million new
jobs each year the net contribution of incumbent firms is typically negative. The
7This holds both in absolute numbers and for the HP-filtered cyclical component. See Appendix.
8The average since 1977 was 17.66%. A similar point can be made for establishment deaths. The
fraction of gross JD from establishment deaths since 2008 was 30.53%, the average since 1977 was
35.38%.
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recent recession has left its mark: While net job creation by incumbent firms quickly
recovered since the end of the recession, job creation by start-ups in 2011 was at its
lowest point since the beginning of the Census BDS series in 1977.9 At the same
time the average size of a start-up has virtually remained unchanged at around 6
employees. This suggests an important extensive margin e↵ect: fewer entrepreneurs
start a business. The drop in start-up hiring stands out as a main factor for low job
creation since 2008. While gross job creation remained low for all firm ages after the
recession trough, the largest decreases in gross job creation occured among start-ups,
followed by the youngest firms. Specifically, in 2011 start-ups created about 700,000
fewer new jobs than in 2007. This is a feature of the ‘Great Recession’ we do not
observe to this extent for the other recessions covered by the BDS data. Figure 1-3
compares changes in absolute gross job creation by firm age relative to the respective
pre-recession year across di↵erent recession episodes.10 During the 1980 recessions
start-up employment initially increased. During the 2001 recession it decreased but
quickly rebounded. The 2008/09 recession was di↵erent: Not only was there an un-
precedented fall in job creation by start-ups and young firms, this decline persisted
even after the o cial end of the recession. Only the recession in the early 1990s bears
similarity to the ‘Great Recession’ in the sense that hiring by young firms decreased
and remained low until several years after the recession trough. The magnitude of
this e↵ect is smaller and the relative e↵ect on start-ups is weaker than in 2008/09,
however. Interestingly, apart from the recent downturn the 1990/91 epsiode was the
only recession where house prices were below trend for a prolonged period of time as
Figure -10 in Appendix A.1 shows. These stylized facts summarize the above results:
Stylized Fact 2: The decrease in job creation was largely due to lower
job creation by start-ups and young firms.
Start-ups have employed around 3 million jobs per year since 1977. Coles and Ke-
lishomi (2011) have pointed out, that this number has been relatively inelastic over
the cycle.11 Using the most recent data the correlation between (the cyclical com-
ponents of) GDP and job creation by start-ups is 0.356. Job creation by incumbent
9This result holds across regions and sectors, as is also discussed in Haltiwanger et al. (2012).
They also note, however, that states that were hit hardest by the financial crisis su↵ered larger
decreases in startup employment, a point that I will take up further below.
10Data for all available age groups is shown. Choosing di↵erent base years leaves results virtually
unchanged. Furthermore, qualitatively identical results can be obtained by plotting job creation
rates or the cohort’s fraction of total job creation (available upon request).
11See Figure -6 in the Appendix for an updated version of a graph used in Coles and Kelishomi
(2011).
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Figure 1-3: The y-axis shows changes in gross job creation relative to base years 1979,
1989, 1999, and 2007. For age group bins averages are shown. Source: BDS.
11
firms, on the other hand, has a higher procyclicality (0.756).12
Stylized Fact 3: Employment in incumbent firms is more strongly pro-
cyclical than employment in start-ups.
However, while start-up job creation is less correlated to fluctuations in GDP, it
nevertheless shows more volatility over time than gross job creation by established
firms. The standard deviation of the cyclical component of job creation over its trend
is about 40% larger for entrants than for incumbent firms (0.10 vs. 0.07).
Stylized Fact 4: Job creation by start-ups is more volatile than job
creation by incumbents.
I divide firms into four size categories, 1-19, 20-99, 100-499, and 500+ employees.
The size and age distribution of firms and establishments can be seen in Tables 3
and 4 in the Appendix. It is noteworthy that while over 95% of firms have less
than 100 employees, it is large firms that employ almost half of the workforce. The
average firm size is 21.43 workers. The distribution of start-ups shows that the vast
majority of start-ups (98.1%) are small firms with less than 20 employees.13 The age
distribution of firms shows that start-ups make up about 11% of all firms. This is
an important statistic that my model is going to match. Start-ups and young firms
show overproportional employment growth: Start-ups employ around 3% of the labor
force, yet contribute 18.7% of total job creation. On the other hand, young firms
show higher-than-average rates of job destruction. A significant fraction of which is
the result of firm exit. These ‘up or out dynamics’ were first described by Haltiwanger
et al. (2010). Conditional on survival, young firms grow considerably faster than their
mature counterparts. As Figure 1-4 shows, in the BDS data around 50% of gross job
destruction is the result of firm exit during the first three years of a firm’s life. On the
other hand, for firms older than 20 years less than 15% of all gross job destruction is
the result of firm exit. The total firm exit rate is 8.8% per year.
12These numbers change only marginally by considering alternative subsets of the data. For
example the correlation between GDP and job creation by start-ups between 1982-2007 is 0.33 and
for gross job creation by incumbents it is 0.72. The correlation between GDP and employment in
incumbent firms is 0.5002.
13Very large start-ups are rare and should be treated with caution, as practise shows they are
often temporary entities that get folded into other firms later on.
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Figure 1-4: Gross Job Creation and Job Destruction from Exit and Downsizing by
Age. Source: Census 1977-2011. Own computations.
1.3.2 Housing and Credit supply
In the wake of the financial crisis there have been numerous initiatives to monitor
credit conditions for small businesses.14 This section will show that after 2007 start-
ups have been facing higher costs of obtaining credit. This is important because
besides personal wealth, banks are the most important source of funding for start-
ups. I present evidence that the sharp drop in the value of real estate, which is a
predominant source of collateral for business formation, is connected to the ongoing
di culty for start-ups to obtain financing. State-level regression results indicate that
changes in the value of real estate have a negative e↵ect on the number of start-ups,
even when controlling for macroeconomic conditions and demand e↵ects.
Start-ups and young firms rely heavily on external liquidity but they face a di↵er-
ent initial lending environment and more challenges than mature firms in obtaining
credit.15 Start-ups do not have an established credit record and typically face restric-
14Those include the reports issued by the Congressional Oversight Panel for the ‘Trou-
bled Asset Relief Program’ (TARP) ({United States Congressional Oversight Panel} (2010)
and {United States Congressional Oversight Panel} (2011)), surveys by the National Feder-
ation of Independent Business (NFIB) summarized in Dennis Jr. (2010), Dennis Jr. (2011),
and Dennis Jr. (2012), and the proceedings of the annual conference of the US Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on ‘Small Business Capital Formation’ (2009),
which can be found at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/sbforum.shtml. Furthermore the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has increased the periodicity of its ‘Quar-
terly Banking Profile’. See also Bassett et al. (2011) for a discussion of the data and
http://www.federalreserve.gov/events/conferences/2010/sbc/agenda.htm for a forum on this topic
organized by the Federal Reserve in July 2010. See also evidence in Foundation (2013), the Survey
of Small Business Finance, and the Statistics of Business Owners.
15See Board (2011), Siemer (2013), Robb and Robinson (2012), the Survey results by the Federal
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tions in their access to commercial bonds or other means of financing available to older
firms. Why would banks not lend (enough) to start-ups? One reason is the general
deterioration in the lending environment of firms.16 More important, however, was
the decline of the value of real estate and household net worth, which acts as collateral
for initial loans. According to Avery et al. (1998) loans having a personal guarantee
account for 55.5% of small business credit dollars. Results from the 2009 and 2010
Surveys of Consumer Finances indicate that personal savings or assets were used as
collateral to initiate more than 70% of new businesses, making personal resources the
most important funding source of entrepreneurs (Board (2011)). Also Mann (1998),
Moon (2009), Dennis Jr. (2010), and Robb and Robinson (2012) highlight the im-
portance of collateralized loans for small business finance. This collateral takes the
form of personal assets - mostly real estate. The decrease in the value of real estate
has made pledging personal commitments more di cult. Figure 1-5 shows that net
mortgage equity extraction dropped from around 8% of disposable personal income
in 2006 to around -6% at the end of 2010, the lowest value on record.17 Although not
all home equity is used for start-up financing, this ‘deleveraging’ by households which
accompanied the dramatic decline in household net worth implies that the amount of
equity available for start-up equity has been severely curtailed.18
State-level regressions: The impact of HPI
I test the hypothesis of a positive link between the value of real estate and the labor
market by combining state-level data on house prices and establishment birth. Ta-
ble 1 shows various state-level regressions. I use establishment births from the BLS
Business Employment Dynamics (BDM) as the dependent variable (BIRTH). Al-
Reserve Banks of New York and Atlanta, as well as Dennis Jr. (2011), who report that young and
small firms almost universally use one or more types of credit from a financial institution. Evidence
in Siemer (2013) further supports the fact that young and small firms are more sensitive to changes
in the credit environment.
16There was an increase in the costs of external finance during the last recession. Both the number
and the dollar amount of approved C&I loans fell by around 20% over the course of the crisis. The
drop in number and dollar amount of small loans (under $1 Million) was particularly severe. At the
end of Q1 2013 the volume of small loans was only 84.84% of its pre-recession value, and their share
of all C&I loans fell from a pre-crisis average of 32.33% to 22.39% in Q1 2013. This decrease in the
number of loans was accompanied by an increase in the interest rate spread between smaller and
riskier loans and the federal funds rate. Figures -11 and -12 in Appendix A.1 show the spread by
loan size and risk.
17Thanks to Bill McBride for providing me with his estimates.
18Further evidence comes from FDIC data on used and unused home equity lines which I produce
in Figure -14 in Appendix A.1. While unused commitments typically exceed outstanding home
equity loans, the 2008/09 recession generated an earlier and steeper decline in unused equity lines.
While part of this decline reflects drawdowns of existing lines a large portion represents a reduction
of the credit supply by banks, as Bassett et al. (2011) argue in a similar context.
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Figure 1-5: Net equity extraction, or mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW) using
the Flow of Funds and BEA data. For comparison the original Kennedy-Greenspan
method is plotted as well. Not seasonally adjusted. Sources: Federal Reserve and
BEA. This graph was created using the methodology proposed in Kennedy (2011) for
updating the estimates presented in Greenspan and Kennedy (2005).
though this is establishment-level and not firm-level data I use this dataset because
of its quarterly frequency. The data is available from Q2 1993-Q2 2013. The main
explanatory variable is the state-level HPI, which comes from the Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA). As additional controls I use two alternative cyclical indica-
tors: the state-level unemployment rate (UE) and state-level personal income (PI). I
use personal income as a cyclical indicator because state-level GDP is only available
on an annual basis. All variables have been HP-filtered. I am controlling for year-
and state-e↵ects and use cluster-robust standard errors in all regressions.19 Summary
statistics for all variables can be found in Appendix A.0. The first column in Ta-
ble 1 shows a simple regression of BIRTH on HPI. The HPI is positively correlated
with the number of new establishments at the state-level. This relationship is robust
to controlling for cyclical indicators: Columns (2), (3), and (4) control for personal
income and unemployment, which are both significant at the 5%-level and have the
expected sign. Column (4) controls for both UE and PI jointly. Here, the state-level
unemployment rate is no longer significant at the 10%-level. The last stylized fact
summarizes the above results:
19I removed the states AK, DC, DE, HI, ND, SD, VT, WV, and WY from the analysis because of
an FHFA warning. The HPI from those states have been derived from fewer than 15,000 transactions
over the last ten years. Using a fixed-e↵ect estimator leaves the results virtually unchanged. The
same is true for using the variables in levels or logs instead of the cyclical component of the HP-
filtered data. Results are available upon request.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
HPI 11.9366⇤ 9.4346⇤ 10.2039⇤ 8.7394⇤
(2.32) (2.36) (2.04) (2.14)
PI 0.0153⇤⇤⇤ 0.0149⇤⇤⇤
(13.98) (14.67)
UE -87.2835⇤ -38.4972
(-2.58) (-1.13)
cons -50.4743 96.9491⇤⇤⇤ -48.6150 -50.1817
(-1.87) (5.27) (-0.62) (-0.69)
N 3276 3276 3276 3276
r2 0.0567 0.0775 0.0590 0.0779
Dependent variable: Establishment Birth. t statistics in parentheses.
All regression include year- and state dummies.
Source: BLS, FHFA, BEA.
All series are quarterly and have been HP-filtered with   = 1600.
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
Table 1.1: Descriptive Regressions at the state level
Stylized Fact 5: During the 2008/09 recession the financing envi-
ronment for start-ups deteriorated. Credit supply by commerical banks
decreased, and the value of real estate - widely used as collateral - fell.
This section has produced five stylized facts about job creation and destruction.
One, high unemployment is mainly driven by low job creation figures. Two, a large
part of the decrease in job creation was due to the behavior of the youngest firms.
Start-ups constitute the single largest contributor to net job creation. It is more
volatile but less cyclical than job creationb by incumbents. Job creation by start-
ups has taken a prolonged dive since the onset of the recent crisis. Five, there was
a decrease in the availability of external finance for start-ups. Credit supply by
commercial banks dropped during the 2008/09 recession, partly because declining
property values diminished the value of collateral. I now present my model which
figures a collateral channel and uses exogenous variation in the value of collateral to
replicate the Stylized Facts presented above.
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1.4 The Model
The economy consists of a fixed mass of workers and entrepreneurs. There is a
competitive bank which provides start-up financing and is jointly owned by all agents.
Each worker and each entrepreneur owns one unit of housing h, the price of which is qh.
Housing provides utility to all agents and can serve as collateral when entrepreneurs
finance start-up loans. Workers can supply labor and consume their income, either
from wages or home production. Entrepreneurs own the production process which
utilizes labor to generate a single consumption good. Output is a function of labor
and two types of profitability: idiosyncratic and aggregate. Shocks to profitability
can be interpreted as changes in productivity or demand. Both types of profitability
evolve persistently over time. Time is discrete and a period refers to one quarter.
The labor market is frictional. To hire unemployed workers firms must post
vacancies v which are filled with endogenous probability. Labor is perfectly divis-
ible. Following the standard search and matching literature a matching function
captures those frictions. It is denoted as m(U, V ) = µU V 1  . Its inputs are the
unemployment rate U and the vacancy rate V . Vacancies posted by firms are filled
with probability H(✓) = m/V. An unemployed worker finds a job with probability
 (U, V ) = m/U . The ratio ✓ ⌘ V/U is a su cient labor market statistic to compute
the vacancy-filling and job-finding rates in this economy. Employed workers may lose
their job if the entrepreneur they are matched with exits or decides to reduce em-
ployment in his production site. The worker takes both the job-finding rate and the
job-destruction rate as exogenous. The workers’ compensation for their labor input
is specified through a bargaining process between the entrepreneur and the worker,
where the entrepreneur has all the bargaining power.20
A fixed cost to production guarantees that firms exit when they receive a su -
ciently low profitability draw. New firms that enter the economy must pay start-up
cost ce. To finance ce, new firms obtain an intra-period loan from the bank. A frac-
tion of the loan can be secured by collateral, for which agents use their real estate h.
Changes in the value of collateral qh lead to variations in the e↵ective cost of entry
c˜e and hence in the number of firms that enter the economy. Shocks to qh are exoge-
nous. I estimate a process of qh and its cross-correlation coe cient with aggregate
TFP from the US data.
The timing of events in my model is based on the setup in Hopenhayn and Roger-
son (1993): Prior to the realizations of new aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, firms
decide whether to continue operating or exit. For new entrants exiting implies that
20This is following Cooper et al. (2007).
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intra-period loans are defaulted on. Then the aggregate state realizes and new firms
enter the economy without knowing their idiosyncratic productivity draw. The id-
iosyncratic shocks realize and all firms decide on their desired employment level.
Bargaining takes place between workers and entrepreneurs, after which production
occurs, and compensations are paid. The model is now explained in more detail.
1.4.1 Workers
Workers can either be employed or unemployed. They derive utility '(h) from housing
independently of their employment status. When they are unemployed they receive
an outside option b(a), which can vary with the aggregate state a. This ouside option
reflects the returns to home production. With probability  (U, V ) an unemployed
worker is able to find a job, thus becoming employed next period. We can write the
value of being unemployed as
W u(a, h) = Z(b(a) + ⇡b) + '(h) +  Ea0|a[ (U, V )W e(a0, h) + (1   (U, V ))W u(a0, h)],
(1.1)
where Z(·) describes the worker’s utility from consumption and redistributed profits
made by the bank ⇡b. The term '(h) describes utility from housing. The discount
factor is  , and  (·) is the job finding rate which depends on the current unem-
ployment rate U as well as the number of vacancies V . The utility function Z(·) is
assumed to be strictly increasing and concave. For simplicity I assume that there is
no disutility from labor. The expectations operator in (1.1) is taken over the future
values of unemployment and unemployment.
By constrast, when a worker is currently employed he receives a compensation
! as defined by the state-contingent contract. With (endogenous) probability   the
worker loses his job and receives the value of unemployment W u(a0, h) next period.
With the remaining probability he continues to be employed.
W e(a, h) = Z(!(a) + ⇡b) + '(h) +  Ea0|a[(1   )W e(a0, h) +  W u(a0, h)] (1.2)
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1.4.2 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs own the production process. Income from firms constitutes the en-
trepreneurs’ only source of income and they consume all profits within the period.21
Entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk-neutral. They produce using a production tech-
nology F (e), where e represents the number of workers. The production function has
the properites Fe(e) > 0 and Fee(e) < 0, meaning it exhibits decreasing returns to
labor, which might arise from fixed factors such as capital or materials, from imper-
fect substitutability for consumers of the goods produced by di↵erent firms or from
managerial span-of-control as in Lucas (1978). At the end of a period entrepreneurs
decide whether to continue operation or exit, based on their expectation of future
shocks.22 At the same time new entrepreneurs enter the economy. After the real-
ization of uncertainty, entrepreneurs make hiring and firing decisions. A fraction  
of the workforce is separated exogenously (quits) each period. Given the state vec-
tor the entrepreneurs and the workers bargain over a compensation !(a, ", e). The
firm’s state vector at time t is (a, ", e, ✓), where ✓ reflects labor market tightness, as
explained in more detail below. The profit function is given by
⇡(a, ", e) = a"F (e)  e!(a, ", e)     C. (1.3)
Output is a↵ected by two multiplicative profitability shocks a, and ". While the
former is an aggregate shock, the latter a↵ects only idiosyncratic profitability. The
term   is a fixed cost of operation to induce exit in low profitability states.23 C defines
a cost function given by
C ⌘  Fv1+   cvv21+   Ff1    cff 21 .
The indicator function 1+ is equal to one if the firm is hiring and equal to 1  if the
firm is firing. The number of vacancies posted is v and the amount of fired workers
is f . There are two types of costs connected to hiring. One is a fixed cost Fv. The
other is a quadratic cost cv. The respective cost associated to firing are given by Ff
21See e.g. evidence in Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) who show that entrepreneurial
risk is not diversified and that dividends from the firm are the only source of income for owners.
22As in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), since there is no additional information gained between
periods, the exit decision is taken at the end of a period. This is mainly a computational convenience.
Since I have one-period loans in my model the end-of-period exit decision is necessary to obtain
default in the same period the loan was issued.
23The entrepreneur’s problem is stated net of housing utility and net of redistributed bank profits
because in the baseline model these values do not a↵ect incumbent entrepreneurs’s optimal deci-
sion. In Appendix A.4 I outline a model where the price of collateral also enters the incumbent
entrepreneur’s problem.
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and cf .
The Employment decision A firm that is operation when idiosyncratic profitabil-
ities are realized is called an incumbent, or ‘continuing’ firm. This firm employed e 1
workers last period and faces a shock x, where x = (a, ") consists of the aggregate
and idiosyncratic productivity realization. Also part of the firm’s state vector is the
aggregate labor market tightness ✓. This determines how e↵ective the firm can hire
new workers. In order to compute the expected value of ✓0 firms require knowledge
about  , the joint distribution over (n, ") and its law of motion. This is described in
detail below. The state vector is summarized by s = (x, e 1; ✓). The value function
for a continuing firm is denoted Qc(s). Because there are fixed costs to variations in
employment, the entrepreneur faces a discrete choice problem within the period. He
can decide between posting vacancies, remaining inactive, and firing workers. Vacan-
cies must be reposted each period. The value Qc(s) is thus given by the maximum of
the values of posting vacancies, firing, and inaction.
Qc(s) = max{Qv(s), Qn(s), Qf (s)} (1.4)
The three Bellman equations will now be described in turn. Because the entrepreneur
can choose to exit at the end of the period, the continuation value in each case is
given by the maximum of the expected value of continuing and exiting. The value of
exit is Qx(e) and will be described below. The value of posting vacancies Qv is given
by
Qv(s) = max
v
⇡(a, ", e) +  Exmax{Qc(x0, e0; ✓0), Qx(e)}, (1.5)
and the evolution of employment is given by the number of quits and the vacancy
filling rate H(✓)
e = e 1(1   ) +H(✓)v,
The value of firing workers is
Qf (s) = max
f
⇡(a, ", e 1(1   )  f) +  Exmax{Qc(x0, e0; ✓0), Qx(e)}. (1.6)
Lastly, the value of inaction is given by
Qn(s) = ⇡(a, ", e 1(1   )) +  Exmax{Qc(x0, e0; ✓0), Qx(e)}. (1.7)
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Here Ex denotes the expectation conditional on the current value of x. The maximum
operator nested on the right-hand side of all three Bellman equations reflects the fact
that a firm can make a decision about exiting before the next period. Since this
is decided before the realization of new information the choice can be made in the
current period. Conditional on this period’s employment choice the entrepreneur must
evaluate the expected value of being active next period, given by Ex [Qc(x0, e0; ✓0)],
and compare this to the present discounted value of exiting, given by Qx(e). This
value is defined below. The policy function for employment will be denoted  e(s).
The employment policy function will be characterized by di↵erent cuto↵ values in the
(x, e 1) space. For a given e 1 there exists a region of inaction over the values of the
idiosyncratic shock due to the presence of fixed costs. An example is given in Figure
-16 in Appendix A.2. For values higher than a cuto↵ profitability, the firm hires new
workers, while for values below a lower cuto↵ profitability workers are shed. Note
that changes in employment do not take ’time-to-build’ because I want to rule this
out as a driver of jobless recoveries.
The Wage Contract We can now define the optimal wage contract between work-
ers and entrepreneurs. The contract specifies w(S), the compensation for a worker
in a firm with state S, where S = (a, ", e, ✓) is the firm’s state vector. A simplifying
assumption is that entrepreneurs are able to make take-it-or-leave-it o↵ers, i.e. the
workers have zero bargaining power.24 The firm thus chooses the wage subject to
the worker’s participation constraint. This is given by W e(a)   W u(a). It says that
the employed workers’ outside option must be at least as large as the remuneration
o↵ered by the contract. In equilibrium the participation constraint will hold with
equality, implying Z(w(S)) + '(h) = Z(b(a)) + '(h), or w(a) = b(a).25 This is a
simple way in which the model generates movements in the wage without the com-
plexity of adding aggregate labor demand as an additional state variable. I assume
the folowing functional form for the outside option b(a) = b0ab1 . The parameter b0
is part of the model calibration, while b1 is estimated from the data. Importantly,
b1 < 1.
24As in Cooper et al. (2007) and many other papers this assumption is employed to facilitate the
computation of the optimal contract. See Elsby and Michaels (2013) and Acemoglu and Hawkins
(2013)for a di↵erent approach based on Stole and Zwiebel (1996). Kaas and Kircher (2011) introduce
a competitive search procedure. This simplification does not change my results qualitatively as long
as the elasticity of the bargained wage with respect to aggregate profitability is not larger than 1,
for which to the best of my knowledge no evidence exists. In Appendix A.4 I show some intuition
for a model with an alternative bargaining rule based on Stole and Zwiebel (1996).
25Formally, the profit maximizing contract results from the following optimization problem:
⇡ˆ(a, ", e) = maxw(S) a"F (e)  ew(S) subject to W e(a)  Wu(a).
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The Exit Decision At the end of a period, before any new information about the
exogenous shocks arrives, an incumbent entrepreneur has to decide whether he wants
to continue operating or exit next period.26 The exit decision is thus based on the
expected future value of the firm, which ensures that a firm will never post vacancies
and exit in the same period. If the entrepreneur decides to exit, he will reduce the
amount of workers to zero (paying the firing costs for the e remaining workers) and
generate zero revenue. However, he avoids paying the fixed cost of operation. Any
outstanding debt obligations are defaulted on. The value of exiting is given by
Qx(e) = 0  Ff   Cfe  0. (1.8)
This formulation implies that once a firm has decided to exit, it can not re-enter the
market. All future profits are zero. The firm decides to exit whenever the expected
value of continuing its operation is below the expected value of exiting with the
current stock of employment carried over from the last period, e.
Ea0,✏0|a,✏ [Qc(a0, "0, e, ✓0)] Qx(e) < 0. (1.9)
Here F , the fixed cost of operation, induces exit for low realizations of " since Qx(e)
is always non-positive. The associated exit policy function will be denoted  x(s) and
takes a value of one if the firm exits, and zero otherwise. Because Qc(x) is increasing
in ", for a given e, a, and ✓ the exit policy function is characterized by a threshold
productivity level "¯x below which a firm exits. This threshold is defined as the lowest
realization of " such that the expected value of continuing exceed the value of exiting.
Definition. The threshold productivity level "¯x below which a firm exits is defined
as
8<:"¯xt = inf
 
" 2 S : Ea0,✏0|a,✏Qc(a0, "0, e 1, ✓0)   Qx(a0, e 1)
 
or
"¯xt = 0 if this set is empty
.
(1.10)
Each period a fraction F ("¯x) of new entrants exits, while the remaining fraction
continues operating. The cuto↵ "¯x is (weakly) decreasing in a, and (weakly) increasing
in ✓ and e 1. The intuition for this is straightforward: Because a is persistent, an
26Note that no additional information is revealed between the end of the current period and the
time of the exit decision. Therefore the firm can determine in period t whether it will choose to exit
in period t+ 1. This insight makes the computation of the problem easier and brings the timing of
the exit decision in line with the default decision by entrants.
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increase in a raises the expected value of the continuing firm. At the same time the
increase in a has no e↵ect on the value of exit. Increases in ✓ decrease the firm’s value
and hence increase "¯x. An increase in ✓ lowers the number of workers a firm that
posts vacancies is able to hire, but has no e↵ect on Qx(·). The cuto↵ "¯x can never
decrease in ✓ because the e↵ect of ✓ on the firm’s value function Qc(s) is less or equal
to zero. Because the adjustment costs are increasing in e 1, everything else equal a
higher employment stock has a positive e↵ect on "¯x.
The Entry Process At the beginning of each period there is a continuum of ex-
ante identical potential entrants. The entry decision is made before the idiosyncratic
profitability is known. Entrants do not pay a fixed cost of operation   in the first
period. Instead, to enter, potential entrants must pay a start-up cost c˜e, which they
compare to the expected value of entry Qe. The cost c˜e ⌘ ce · R˜ consists of a positive
physical entry cost ce times the interest rate charged by the bank, R˜ (defined below).27
If the value function Qc is known, the value of entry gross of entry costs is given by
the value of an incumbent firm evaluated at zero employment and the expected initial
productivity draw
Qe(a, ✓) ⌘
ˆ
✏
Qc(a, "0, 0, ✓)d⌫.
Once an entrepreneur has decided to enter he receives an initial profitability draw "0
from a distribution ⌫, which may di↵er from the distribution of incumbents produc-
tivity draws. After the initial period, profitability evolves identically to that of all
other incumbent firms. Employment in start-ups is given by the amount of succesful
hires, e = H(✓)v. The value of entry is increasing in a and decreasing in ✓. Total
start-up job creation is
´
✏  
e(a, "0, 0, ✓)d⌫. Firms entering in period t have mass Mt,
which is pinned down via a free-entry condition. Free entry requires that the cost of
entry be equal to the value of entry.
c˜e = Q
e(a, ✓). (1.11)
Proposition 1. There is a unique Mt which solves (1.11).
The proof can be found in Appendix A.2. The logic is that as Mt increases, labor
market tightness ✓ goes up since more firms are hiring. This negatively a↵ects Qe
since a firm needs to post more (costly) vacancies to fill the same number of jobs. On
27I restrict attention to the case where ce < c⇤, where c⇤ > 0 is a number such that if ce   c⇤ no
positive entry rates exist and the equilibrium is one of no firms. In the numerical solution of the
model it will furthermore be the case that ce    , meaning that entrants have to pay a cost higher
than the fixed cost of operation.
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the other hand, c˜e is increasing in ✓ as the next section will show. This is a result
of the exit threshold "¯x which is increasing in the labor market tightness. With Qe
monotonically decreasing and c˜e monotonically increasing in ✓ the intersection where
(1.11) holds is unique.
1.4.3 The Bank
The bank is owned by all agents in the economy and behaves competitively, i.e.
makes zero profits. To pay the entry cost ce new firms must obtain a loan from the
bank. Firms that are still in operation at the end of the period pay back the loan
plus any interest payments that accrued. Entrepreneurs can use their real estate as
collateral to secure part of the loan. This can be thought of as a shortcut for the
idea that in reality some loans are completely secured by real estate while others are
not. Putting down collateral for a loan is desirable because uncollateralized loans are
risky for the bank, while collateralized loans are not. A start-up entrepreneur may
strategically choose to exit and hence walk away from his obligations before the loan
has to be repaid. Therefore, the bank e ciently prices interest rates by charging a
default premium on the uncollateralized fraction of the loan in order to compensate
itself for expected losses.28 The collateralized fraction of the loan is riskless for the
bank, hence the intra-period interest rate for it is 1. The fraction of the loan that
can be collateralized depends on the value of real estate, qh. The diagram in Figure
1-6 illustrates the structure of the loan.
Interest Rates and the Value of Collateral Default occurs with positive prob-
ability, i.e. whenever a borrowing firm chooses to exit. In that case the bank claims
the collateral which was used to secure the loan. No repayment is received for the
uncollateralized fraction of the loan because - as can be seen from (1.8) - profits are
non-positive if a firm exits. Payment of collateralized loans can always be enforced by
the bank in case of default, hence the intra-period interest rate for this part of a loan
is equal to the risk-free rate 1. This corresponds to the bottom area in Figure 1-6.
The remaining fraction of the loan is not secured by collateral and the bank charges
a loan rate Rˆ   1. Since the bank is perfectly competitive the loan rate is determined
by a zero-profit condition Rˆ(1  F ("¯x)) = 1. This implies that the risk-neutral bank
receives the same expected return as the risk-free rate, which is 1. The total loan
28This is similar to the mechanism in Townsend (1979) and Bernanke et al. (1999) where the bank
faces a costly state-verification problem. In my model state-verification is costless but in case of
defalt the bank is unable to recuperate any fraction of the initial loan because wages are paid before
the intra-period loan is reimbursed. I choose this timing of events in order to eliminate the default
dimension from the worker-firm bargaining problem.
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Figure 1-6: The Intra-period Loan. For the collateralized fraction of the loan the
intra-period interest rate is 1. The uncollateralized part includes a positive default
risk for which the bank charges a no-default interest rate larger than unity.
rate paid on ce is denoted R˜ and is given by a combination of the risk-free rate and
Rˆ. Proposition 2 defines it.
Proposition 2. The loan rate R˜ is given by8<:R˜ =
qh
ce
+
⇣
ce qh
ce
⌘
· Rˆ if qh < ce
R˜ = 1 if qh   ce
,
where
Rˆ =
✓ˆ 1
"¯x
d⌫
◆ 1
.
The proof can be found in the appendix. The intuition for the result is that if
qh   ce the new entrepreneur can fully collateralize his loan, which implies that he
pays the risk-free rate on the intra-period loan. If qh < ce he receives the risk-free
rate only on a fraction q
h
ce
< 1 of the loan. The di↵erence ce  qh of the loan ce has to
be borrowed at the risky interest rate Rˆ. This rate is increasing in the probability of
receiving an initial profitability draw below "¯x. If an entrant would never choose to
exit, then the integral
´1
"¯x d⌫ = 1 and Rˆ = R˜ = 1. Changes in R˜ are a key driver for
the dynamics of the model because changes in the cost of entry have important e↵ects
on the number of entrants and hence on job creation and unemployment. Since "¯x is
(weakly) decreasing in a and (weakly) increasing in ✓ it follows that both Rˆ and R˜
are (weakly) decreasing in a and (weakly) increasing in ✓. Furthermore, the e↵ective
loan rate R˜ is (weakly) decreasing in qh.
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1.4.4 Equilibrium
The distribution over incumbent firms In the absence of aggregate shocks (as
in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993)) it is possible to solve for a stationary distribu-
tion of incumbent firms  ⇤. Although my model incorporates aggregate shocks it is
useful to spell out the transition of the firm distribution here, since the non-stochastic
simulation method is based on it. The distribution over incumbent firms in period
t is given by  t. The mass of entering firms shall be denoted Mt. I will drop the
time subscripts for notational convenience. The transition from any   to  0 will be
written as  0 = T ( ,M). The operator T is linearly homogeneous in   andM jointly.
This implies that if we doubled the amount of firms in this economy and doubled the
amount of entrants the resulting distribution would be unchanged.
Assuming that some initial distribution  0 exists and given the policy functions
for employment and exit the law of motion of the distribution over incumbent firms
is given as follows. For any set (e x)0 2 E ⇥X, where E and X respectively denote
the employment and exogenous shock space the law of motion for   is
 0((e x)0 2 E ⇥X) =
ˆ
x2x0
ˆ
E⇥X
(1   x(x, e; ✓))⇥ 1{ e(x,e;✓)2e0} ⇥ F (dx0|x) (dex)
+M ⇥
ˆ
x2x0
ˆ
0⇥X
⇥1{ e(x,0;✓)2e0} ⇥ F (dx0|x)⌫(dx). (1.12)
This defines the operator T . For the case without aggregate shocks x = " and a
stationary distribution  ⇤ exists.29
Endogenous and Exogenous processes The law of motion for the labor market
tightness ✓ follows the law of motion
✓0 = H(a, a0, ).
29Equation (1.12) can be most easily read by fixing an exogenous state x0, then integrating over
the space of incumbents (E⇥X) and selecting those for whom the policy function  e(·) prescribes e0.
The term F (dx0|x) defines the probability that a firm with current productivity x has productivity
x0 next period. This is multiplied with   to obtain the mass of these firms. The second term refers
to entrants, who have mass M . Their initial employment is equal to zero and they cannot exit in
the same period as they enter, otherwise the structure is identical. The stationary equilibrium with
entry and exit is given by  ⇤ = (I   ⇡0) 1(⇡0 ⇤E),where   is the distribution over incumbents, ⇡ is
the transition matrix and E is the distribution over entrants.
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The knowledge of H requires the joint distribution over employment and idiosyncratic
profitability, which is (theoretically) infinitely-dimensional. I follow the approach de-
veloped by Krusell and Smith (1998) described in the following section. Briefly, the
approach consists of postulating a functional form for H which entrepreneurs use to
make their optimal decisions. From a subsequent simulation of the model one can
check the consistency between the actual law of motion of ✓ and the one predicted
by the guess of H. The resulting equilibrium must be such that H must track the
evolution of ✓ very accurately. This is explained in more detail below.
Unemployment in the model follows U 0 = (1 U) (U, V )+ (1  (U, V ))U , where
 (U, V ) is the separation rate and  (U, V ) describes the job-finding rate. I assume
that the logarithms of both a, ", and qh follow autoregressive processes.
ln at = ⇢aln at 1 + va,t , va ⇠ N(0,  a) (1.13)
ln "t = ⇢"ln "t 1 + v",t , v" ⇠ N(0,  ") (1.14)
qht = ⇢qq
h
t 1 + vq,t , vq ⇠ N(0,  q) (1.15)
The initial productivity of entrants is determined by a drawn from v⌫ ⇠ N(0,  ⌫) and
then evolves according to (1.14). In the simulation I enforce a correlation coe cient
between qh and a obtained from the data.
Equilibrium For a given  0 a recursive competitive equilibrium consists of (i)
value functionsQc(a, ✏, e 1; ✓) andQe(a, ✏i,0, ✓), (ii) policy functions  e(a, ✏, e 1; ✓) and
 x(a, ✏, e 1; ✓), (iii) bounded sequences of non-negative negotiated wages {wt}1t=0 and
interest rates {Rˆt}1t=0, unemployment {Ut}1t=0, vacancies {Vt}1t=0, incumbent measures
{ t}1t=0 and entrant measures {Mt}1t=0 such that (1) Qc(a, ✏, e 1; ✓),  e(a, ✏, e 1; ✓),
and  x(a, ✏, e 1; ✓) solve the incumbent’s problem, (2) {wt}1t=0 satisfies the worker’s
participation constraint, and {Rˆt}1t=0 is given by the bank’s zero-profit condition, (3)
labor market tightness {✓t}1t=0 is determined by the ratio of vacancies {Vt}1t=0 over un-
employment {Ut}1t=0, (4) the measure of entrants is given by the free-entry condition
(1.11), (5)  t evolves according to (1.12).30
30In the economy with aggregate shocks this equilibrium is boundedly rational because the law of
motion for ✓ is approximated.
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1.4.5 Calibration
I calibrate the model at quarterly frequency. The steady state equilibrium without
aggregate shocks matches US non-farm establishment level data. All paramter values
together with their calibration targets are listed in Table 1.2. The parameters can
be divided into two groups. The first group consists of parameters that are either
taken from the existing literature or backed out given static calibration targets. The
second group of parameters is estimated with a simulated method of moments (SMM)
procedure. The first group includes the discount factor  , the curvature of the profit
function ↵, the value of leisure parameters, the parameters governing the evolution
of the aggregate states, as well as the parameters of the matching function.   and
↵ are taken from the literature. I fit AR(1)-processes to the data to back out the
persistence and innovation parameters for a and qh. For a I use US output from
1977-2011, while for qh I use the purchase-only HPI from 1977-2011. Both series
are HP-filtered. The correlation between output and HPI is 0.628. I enforce this
correlation coe cient onto the simulated processes. Recall that workers’ value of
leisure is b(a) = b0ab1 . To estimate b1 I use (HP-filtered, seasonally adjusted) average
weekly wages from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) between
2001 and 2011. The correlation between the cyclical component of this series and GDP is
0.49, which is almost identical to the value used in Cooper et al. (2007). I calibrate b0 to
match an average firm size of 21.43 from the BDS data.Regarding the parameters of
the matching function, I assume a constant returns to scale function which takes the
form
m = µU V 1   = µV ✓  ,
where ✓ ⌘ VU measures labor market tightness. The job-finding rate of a worker is
defined as   = m/U , which given the functional form for the matching function takes
the form   = µ✓1  . Similarly the vacancy-filling rate for firms, H = m/V takes
the form H = µ✓  . Based on BLS data the average unemployment rate over the
time of my sample (1977-2010) was 6.3%, which serves as my target for the steady
state. I target a vacancy-filling probability of 0.71, in line with empirical evidence
in Den Haan et al. (2000), Pissarides (2009), Shimer (2012), and Elsby and Michaels
(2013). The same studies suggest a steady-state value of ✓ = 0.70. The matching
elasticity   is set to 0.60.31 My target for the vacancy-filling rate together with a
choice of   implies a matching e ciency parameter of µ = 0.5732.
The cost parameters in C and the parameters governing the idiosyncratic prof-
31This is based on a survey by Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001). Cooper et al. (2007) estimate
this parameter to be .36, Hall (2005b) finds 0.72.
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Calibrated Parameters Symbol Value Source
Discount Factor   0.99 implies rann = 4%
Curvature of profit function ↵ 0.65 Cooper et al. (2007)
Autocorrelation of a ⇢a 0.95 Output 1977-2011
Standard deviation of ⌫a  a 0.05 Output 1977-2011
Autocorrelation of qh ⇢q 0.9565 HPI 1977-2011
Standard deviation of ⌫q  q 0.08 HPI 1977-2011
Correlation qh and a ⇢a,q 0.628 same as above
Base wage b0 0.9 Average firms size 21.43
Sensitivity of outside option to a b1 0.49 BLS QCEW
Matching elasticity   0.6 Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001)
Match e ciency µ 0.5732 H = 0.71, ✓ = 0.7
Estimated Parameters Symbol Value Calibration Target / Source
Fixed costs vacancies Fv 0.01 Inaction in  e
Quadratic costs vacancies cv 0.005 Small changes in  e
Fixed costs firing Ff 0.01 Inaction in  e
Quadratic costs firing cf 0.005 Small changes in  e
Fixed costs of operation   3.3 Firm Exit Rate 8.8% (BDS)
Autocorrelation of " ⇢" 0.97 Firm size distribution
Standard deviation of "  " 0.02 Distribution of  e, JC
Std dev of initial productivity  ⌫ 0.02 Start-up Fraction of JC = 18.7%
Table 1.2: Parameter Values. The first block consists of calibrated parameters, the
parameters in the second block consists were estimated via SMM.
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itability process are consistently estimated via SMM. This entails finding the vector
of structural parameters ⇥ which minimizes the (weighted) distance L(⇥) between
data moments and moments of the model. The distance is defined as
L(⇥) =
⇣
 D    M(⇥)
⌘
⌅
⇣
 D    M(⇥)
⌘0
,
where  D are data moments and  M(⇥) are moments from a simulation of the model,
given parameters ⇥. The weighting matrix is ⌅. I solve the dynamic programming
problem and generate policy functions given a parameter vector ⇥. From the simula-
tion of the model I then obtain  M(⇥).32 The algorithm finds the parameter vector
⇥ which minimizes L(⇥). The parameter vector is ⇥ = (Ff , cf , Fv, cv, , ⇢",  ",  ⌫).
I restrict the model such that F f = Fv and cf = cv, i.e. hiring and firing costs
are symmetric. The moments  D chosen to estimate ⇥ are motivated by Cooper
et al. (2012) and Berger (2012) and are reported in the column ‘Data’ in Table 1.3.
The first four moments are derived from the distribution of employment changes for
continuing establishments using Census BDS data between 1985-1999. The first row
reports the inaction rate, i.e. the fraction of establishments that did not undergo any
employment change over the course of one year. The high value suggests that fixed
costs of labor adjustment are important. The second column | e|  .1 reports the
fraction of ‘small’ employment changes of under 10% in absolute value. Rows 3 and
4 report large positive and negative employment changes of over 30%. These large
changes are very prevalent in the data, indicating large changes in firm-level produc-
tivity over time. Row 5 is the firm exit rate from the BDS data between 1977 and
2011. From the same data comes the fraction of gross job creation through firm birth,
which is around 19%. Both ⇥ and  D consist of six (unique) elemts, but there exists
no direct mapping between them. The following can be said about the identification,
however: The fixed costs Ff and Fv play a crucial role for generating inaction, while
the quadratic costs are identified through small employment changes, | e|  .1. The
quadratic costs also play an important role for generating exit among large plants.
The operational overhead cost   is used to pin down the exit rate. Start-up job cre-
ation largely depends on the initial productivity draw, whose variance is governed by
 ⌫ . The persistence of the idiosyncratic shock ⇢" is crucial for determining the shape
of the size and age distributions and a↵ects the frequency of employment adjustments.
The variance of " is important for large adjustments and the size distribution of firms.
It indirectly a↵ects all moments in  M(⇥). The stationary model is further discussed
below.
32Equilibrium is enforced during all of these estimations, meaning that the entrepreneur’s beliefs
about ✓ are consistent.
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Data Moments Model Moments
 e = 0 0.38 0.36
| e|  .1 0.09 0.07
 e > .3 0.15 0.15
 e <  .3 0.14 0.16
Exit Rate 8.8% 6.3%
Start-up JC 18.7% 17.0%
Table 1.3: Data Moments and SMM estimates. Column 3 estimates the benchmark
model using symmetric adjustment costs (AC) for hiring and firing. The employment
change numbers are taken from Berger (2012) who uses LBD averages between 1985-
1999 . The exit rate and start-up JC rate are computed using BDS data.
1.5 Computational Strategy
Firms need to forecast ✓0 in order to compute the expected vacancy-filling rate
H(U, V ). The variable ✓ is determined in equilibrium. While firms take this function
as given, it must be consistent with the relationship generated by the model. In the
stationary model without aggregate shocks there is a steady state value ✓⇤ which can
easily be determined. Including aggregate shocks creates a non-trivial computational
problem, which I solve similarly to Krusell and Smith (1998). The free-entry con-
dition is given by (1.11). The labor-market tightness ✓ is now a slow-moving state
variable about which firms must generate consistent forecasts. The solution of this
model is non-trivial since firms need to forecast the entire cross-sectional joint dis-
tribution of employment and productivity in order to forecast labor market tightness
in the following period. In the presence of aggregate shocks, this distribution moves
over time and the state-space becomes (theoretically) infinite-dimensional. Following
the seminal work of Krusell and Smith (1998) an approximate solution can be found
by postulating that firms track only several moments of this joint distribution. The
first moments usually turns out to be a su cient statistic. The word su cient typi-
cally means that the forecast generates a high R2. However, as Den Haan (2010) has
shown, it should also be verified that the maximum forecast errors that result from the
approximated law of motion are small. In the present framework firms are ultimately
interested in forecasting ✓0, the labor market tightness next period. The perceived
law of motion of ✓ is denoted ✓0 = H(✓, A0, A), where H(·) is to be determined as
part of the solution of the model. Firms make their forecasts of ✓0 conditional on
the current realizations of ✓ and A, as well as on possible future realizations A0. The
solution algorithm first postulates an initial guess for for H(·). Next, policy functions
are computed given the guess. Following a simulation, the parameters of H(·) are
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updated. This procedure is repeated until the current guess and the updated version
of H(·) are su ciently close (consistency) and until H tracks the evolution of ✓ with
high accuracy. I guess a log-linear prediction rule for ✓0.
log ✓t = b0 + b1 log ✓t 1 + b2 logAt + b3 logAt 1 + b4 · IAt 6=At 1
The last term, IAt 6=At 1 , is an indicator function which takes the value of one if
At 6= At 1. The coe cients that minimize the stopping criterion are given by
log ✓t =  0.0087+0.9939·log ✓t 1+20.996·logAt 21.095·b3 logAt 1+0.2327·IAt 6=At 1 .
This functional form for H(·) generates an R2 = 0.9994 and a maximum forecast error
of 0.005%. Accuracy plots can be found in the Appendix A.2. Note that without
financing friction (i.e. no variation in qh) the computational problem is much easier to
solve. When the only shocks are to a the model behaves very similarly to the standard
HR model. In particular, the free entry condition reduces the computational burden
because the future value of ✓ can be computed without a Krusell-Smith type algorithm
for the cross-sectional distribution. The reason is that with free entry aggregate labor
demand becomes perfectly elastic and for each a there exists one value of ✓ which is
consistent with equilibrium. Free-entry of new firms makes the tightness parameter
✓ respond 1:1 to changes in the aggregate state a.33 However, such a model generates
unrealistically volatile entry rates and basically reduces the model to a function of
the aggregate state a, with some propagation through the adjustment costs.
The simulation of the model is carried out using a non-stochastic simulation tech-
nique. The algorithm does not draw a random sequence of idiosyncratic shocks for
each firm and play out the policy function for a large number of periods. Instead, my
algorithm computes the exact mass of firms at each grid point jointly representing
idiosyncratic productivity and employment. This solution method is applicable for
both the stationary and non-stationary version of the economy. The main advan-
tages of this approach are its speed and the fact that it eliminates sampling error.
Den Haan (2010) showed that this latter source of error can become important in
Krusell-Smith type solution algorithms. The details of this algorithm are laid out in
33The labor market tightness ‘jumps’ with the aggregate state when the only shocks are to a. The
true and the approximated law of motion are almost indistinguishable. A regression which ignores
past realizations of ✓ produces an R2 > 0.99 and a maximum forecast error of 0.0052%. The R2
is not equal to 1 because ✓ influences the interest rate Rˆ which e↵ects the number of entrants and
hence the labor market tightness. Including past realizations of ✓ into the regression increases the
R2 to over 0.99999999.
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Firm Age
Firms Employment
Data Model Data Model
Start-Ups 11% 12% 3% 5%
Age 1-2 16% 19% 6% 8%
Age 3-5 17% 22% 8% 13%
Age 6-20 41% 40% 27% 23%
Age 21+ 15% 8% 56% 51%
Table 1.4: Age-distribution of firms. Census BDS data and results from the stationary
model.
Appendix A.3.
1.6 Quantitative Results
This section describes the numerical results. I evaluate the performance of the sta-
tionary model with respect to non-targeted moments and then discuss the results of
the model with aggregate shocks.
1.6.1 Results of the stationary model
Table 1.3 showed the match of targeted moments. The employment change distribu-
tion as well as the exit rate and job creation by start-ups generated by the model are
very close to their counterparts in the US data. The fit of the firm-age distributions of
the calibrated model is shown in Table (1.4). The model matches the age distribution
of firms well but slightly underpredicts the amount of old firms.
1.6.2 Results with Aggregate Shocks
I now add aggregate shocks to the model in order to assess the business cycle prop-
erties of the model and evaluate its quantitative performance. To demonstrate the
e↵ect of shocks to aggregate productivity and the HPI, impulse repsonse functions are
generated. I also test alternative model specifications without financial frictions and
without adjustment costs in order to build some intuition about the respective e↵ects
those features on the results. Finally, I show a policy experiment which allows me to
back out the e↵ects of the decrease in the HPI on the increase and persistence of un-
employment during and after the Great Recession. The main results are summarized
in Tables 1.5 and 1.6.
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 U ⇢U  V ⇢V ⇢U,V  ✓ ⇢✓
US Data 0.13 0.948 0.16 0.93 -0.896 0.316 0.94
Benchmark Model 0.13 0.996 0.17 0.91 -0.86 0.303 0.943
constant qh 0.17 0.995 0.198 0.95 -0.94 0.359 0.984
constant a 0.02 0.99 0.02 0.90 -0.89 0.03 0.97
Table 1.5: Business Cycle Statistics of the Model. Source: FRED, FHFA, and BLS.
Data (1995Q1-2010Q4) and model moments have been computed as log deviations
from mean/trend. Vacancy data starts in 2001Q1.   denotes the standard deviation
and ⇢ the autocorrelation of unemployment (U), vacancies (V ), and labor market
tightness (✓). The term ⇢U,V is the correlation between unemployment and vacancies.
Results of the Benchmark Model
This section describes the results of the benchmark model which includes shocks to a
and qh. The model is able to match the key statistics of the US labor market regarding
unemployment, vacancies, and their joint movement. Those statistics are reported in
the first row of Table 1.5. The resulst of the benchmark model are in the second row.
Both the volatility and the autocorrelation of unemployment, vancancies, and labor
market tightness are close to their counterparts in the data. However, the persistence
of unemployment is overstated, while the persistence of vacancies is understated with
respect to the data. The correlation between unemployment and vacancies is strongly
negative, as in the data. Given that the model was not calibrated to generate these
moments the close fit can be considered a success of the calibration strategy.
The second set of results focuses on the cyclicality and volatility of employment
in start-ups vis-a-vis incumbent firms. Two of the stylized facts presented in Sec-
tion 2 were that job creation by incumbents is more strongly pro-cyclical, while job
creation by start-ups is more volatile around its trend. Those facts are summarized
in the first row of Table 1.6. The first two columns show the correlation between
GDP and job creation by entrants (E ) and incumbents (I ). The last two rows re-
port the standard deviation of the cyclical component of job creation over the trend
component for the two groups.34 The model generates the lower pro-cyclicality of
job creation by entrants with respect to incumbents. The good fit in the correla-
tion between GDP and job creation by new firms is achieved through the e↵ect of
house prices qh on the entry process as will be explained below. Furthermore, the
model replicates the higher correlation between GDP and job creation by incumbent
34I divide the series by their respective trend in order to control for the fact that otherwise the
large number of jobs created by incumbents blows up the standard deviation of the series. An
alternative measure that delivers similar results is the coe cient of variaion.
34
firms. This has been an important feature of the recovery after the Great Recession.35
The benchmark model can generate ‘jobless recoveries’ through the e↵ect of house
prices qh on the start-up process. Imagine a situation where both aggregate profitabil-
ity and the HPI are below their unconditional means. Now both shocks start reverting
back but - as we will see below - the e↵ects on unemployment and total output of
the two shocks di↵er significantly. Other than the shock to aggregate profitability
the shock to qh exerts only very mild influence on total output. By directly impact-
ing entry, the decrease in qh has a large e↵ect on hiring by start-ups, and thus on
unemployment. The fraction of total hiring by start-ups is overproportional to their
share of total output. Therefore, if the number of entrants decreases, the e↵ect on
unemployment is larger than the e↵ect on GDP. Incumbent firms are only indirectly
a↵ected by the HPI through an e↵ect on ✓. On the other hand, shocks to a have the
e↵ect that hiring - and most importantly - output by incumbent firms changes. Since
the lion’s share of total output is produced by incumbent firms, an increase in a after
an initial negative shock has an immediate e↵ect on output and employment. This
is why a shock to a alone cannot generate a jobless recovery. It requires the e↵ect on
entry - exerted by shocks to qh - to make the unemployment rate react sluggishly and
uncouple it from the strong co-movement with GDP. The impulse response functions
will show this in more detail.
Results of the Alternative Model Specifications
We can now compare the benchmark results to those of the model without financial
frictions or without shocks to aggregate productivity. The results are summarized
in the last two rows of Tables 1.5 and 1.6. Table 1.5 shows that the business cycle
statistics of the model without the financial friction are similar to the benchmark
model. The volatility of unemployment and vacancies, as well as the correlation
between the two is slightly overstated. Furthermore, ✓ is more volatile than in the
data. The fact that the model produces similar moments as the benchmark model
is not very surprising given the similarity of the model without the financial friction
to Cooper et al. (2007), who find similar results. The model without shocks to a,
on the other hand, is unable to capture some of the key US business cycle statistics.
In particular, the model does not generate enough variation in unemployment and
vacancies. The reason is that variations in qh have a strong e↵ect on start-ups but
only an indirect e↵ect (through labor market tightness) on incumbent firms. The
movements in ✓ generated by changes in qh are by themselves not su cient to generate
35See the additional material, e.g. Figure -6 in Appendix A.1.
35
⇢(Y,NE) ⇢(Y,N I)  (c/t)E  (c/t)I
US Data 0.35 0.76 0.10 0.07
Benchmark Model 0.34 0.65 0.20 0.07
constant qh 0.60 0.79 0.30 0.07
constant a 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.06
Table 1.6: Data and Model Moments. Source: BDS 1977-2011. The resulting model
moments have been computed using time aggregation. Data and model moments
have been computed as log deviations from mean/trend. ⇢(Y,NE) and ⇢(Y,N I) show
the correlation between GDP and gross job creation by entrants and incumbents.
The standard deviation of the cyclical over the trend component of job creation by
start-ups are ( (c/t)E) and  (c/t) for incumbent firms.
the observed time-series volatility. Table 1.6 shows the model performance regarding
job creation by entrants and incumbents.
Impulse Response Functions
In order to disentangle the respective e↵ects of ✓ and a I show several impulse re-
sponse functions in Figures 1-7-1-9. Figure 1-7 studies a negative shock to aggregate
profitability, Figure 1-8 shows results for a negative shock to qh, and in Figure 1-9
both shocks occur simultaneously. For comparability between the IRFs the size of
the (negative) shocks to a and qh were chosen to generate the same contemporaneous
increase in unemployment. The figures are all constructed in the same way: The
first panel shows the e↵ect of the shock to the exogenous state. The second panel
(clockwise) shows the e↵ects on unemployment and GDP. The third panel plots the
labor market tightness ✓, while the last panel shows the e↵ect on start-up activity.
I start with Figure 1-7 where the e↵ects of a drop in a are analyzed. The first
panel shows that in period t = 10 aggregate profitability falls by 1.22%. This results
in a contemporaneous increase of the unemployment rate by 5.8%, and a fall in
GDP by 1.35%. Labor market tightness falls, both because incumbent firms post
fewer vacancies and because there are fewer entrants. The last panel also shows
that the mass of entrants quickly rebounds after the initial shock. The reason is
that the entrants are facing a trade-o↵ between the lower aggregate profitability and
the decreased labor market tightness. The latter has the e↵ect of making it more
profitable for potential entrants to start operating. Starting in period t = 14 the
mass of entrants is above its unconditional mean, beginning to restore the total mass
of firms to its pre-recession value.
Now I turn to analyzing the implications of a negative shock to qh. The first
panel of Figure 1-8 shows that in period t = 10 qh decreases by 4.12%.36 The shock
36
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Figure 1-7: Impulse Response Functions for a shock to a. Simulation results from
10,000 repititions of 200 periods.
Figure 1-8: Impulse Response Functions for a shock to qh. Simulation results from
10,000 repititions of 200 periods.
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generates an increase in unemployment of 5.8%. This can be seen in the second
panel. The shock to qh produces a smaller decrease in GDP (0.48%) than the shock
to a. This is because incumbent firms are only indirectly a↵ected by the HPI shock,
namely through the e↵ect on ✓ which is displayed in the third panel. Labor market
tightness decreases when the shock occurs and then slowly recovers. For incumbents
firms and hiring entrants this implies that following the shock to qh the vacancy-
filling probability H(✓) increases. This has the e↵ect that job creation by incumbent
firms increases. The last panel shows the e↵ect on the number of start-ups. The
most important di↵erence with respect to the e↵ects of a shock to a is that the mass
of entrants is a↵ected both more severely and for a longer period of time. After a
rebound to around 92% of its steady-state value in t = 11 the entry rate is only
gradually moving back towards its unconitional mean.The shock to a generated a
tradeo↵ between lower profitability and lower ✓, which induced high entry rates after
aggregate productivity had been beginning to recover. The outcome generated by the
drop in qh is di↵erent in the sense that the higher entry costs outweigh the e↵ects of
the drop in ✓ for new entrants. This is the main takeaway from Figures 1-7 and 1-8: In
the context of the model, a jobless recovery must be the result of a simultaneous shock
to both a and qh. While the mean reversion of aggregate profitability brings GDP
back to its pre-recession value, the slow recovery of the HPI has almost no output
e↵ect, but a large positive e↵ect on the unemployment rate. Therefore, although
GDP is above its recession trough, the decline in the unemployment rate is strongly
underproportional to this decrease.
Figure 1-9 shows results for a simultaneous shock to a and qh. The first panel
plots the two shock processes. The second panel shows that the average increase in
unemployment is 10.2%, while GDP drops by 1.59%, both of which is lower than the
sum of the e↵ects of the individual shocks. Both shocks are mean reverting but the
persistent qh shock keeps the unemployment rate high although GDP has practically
recovered its pre-shock value (after t = 20 average GDP stands at 0.9978 of the
pre-shock value). The e↵ect on the number of entrants is strong. There is a sharp
rebounce in the periods after the initial shock but no overshooting, as the dampening
e↵ect of the low qh prevails over the mean reversion in the shock to a.
36This is a failry large shock compared to the decrease in the HPI during the Great Recession.
The average HPI growth between 2007Q1 and 2011Q1 was -1.46% per quarter, the minimum was
-2.88%.
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Figure 1-9: Impulse Response Functions for a shock to a and qh. Simulation results
from 1,000 repititions of 200 periods.
Policy Experiment
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 showed that the model is able to match they key properties of the
US labor market as well the cyclicality and volatility of job creation by entrants and
incumbent firms. The impulse response functions were meant to create some intuition
about the e↵ect of the two shocks. I now test in how far the model can replicate the
relationship between the cyclical components of GDP growth and unemployment
during the ‘Great Recession’. To evaluate the model’s performance in this respect
I feed in the observed house price index between 1990Q1 and 2013Q1 (see Figure
-10). Furthermore, I pick the sequence of aggregate productivity shocks to match
the cyclical component of GDP over the same period. I simulate the model for 93
periods after some initial periods for the model to reach the stationary distribution. I
choose 93 periods because this corresponds to the number of quarterly observations.
The results are presented in Figure 1-10. The co-movement of the two time series
is extremely strong, particularly during the ‘Great Recession’, indicated by the third
shaded area. The simulated data is able to explain 72.23% of the variation of the
unemployment rate observed in the data. For the period starting in 2006 the simulated
data can even explain 84.66% of the movement in the unemployment rate. The
recovery is ‘jobless’ because of the ongoing negative influence of the low HPI on start-
39
Figure 1-10: Cyclical component of the unemployment rate. Data vs. simulation us-
ing estimated processes for a and qh between 1990 and 2011. Shaded areas correspond
to NBER recession dates.
up job creation. Like in the data this leads to high levels of unemployment even after
the o cial recession end. We see that job creation by start-ups decreased prior to the
beginning of the recession. The model has this feature simply because the drop in the
HPI precedes the decline in aggregate productivity.37 Net job creation by incumbents
begins to recover before job creation by start-ups. This is the case because at the end
of the recession incumbent firms take advantage of the high vacancy filling probability
due to the low ✓, while hiring for start-ups remains costly because of the ongoing low
qh which increases the cost for setting up shop. What the model is unable to match
is the time lag in the respective troughs of the HPI and job creation by start-ups. In
the simulation job-creation by start-ups coincides with the trough in the HPI series,
while in the data job creation by start-ups was lower in 2011 than in 2009.
In Appendix A.2 I repeat this experiment when there are only shocks to a or
qh. Figures -17 and -18 show that although the variation in qh generates a lot of
movement in the unemployment rate it is not enough to reproduce the large increase
in unemployment which accompanied the recent recession.38
37The HPI showed negative growth rates as early as Q12006, while the NBER dates the beginning
of the recession in Q42007.
38The qh shock alone explains about 59.25% and the a shock alone about 56.93% of the variation
in unemployment.
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Figure 1-11: Sample simulation when the only shocks are to aggregate profitability.
The first panel shows unemployment and GDP. The second panel shows the mass of
entrants, and the last panel shows the true and approximated values of ✓.
1.6.3 Evaluation of Results
This is a rich model in which the mapping from parameters to moments is not im-
mediately clear. I therefore show several additional Figures here to help build some
intuition for the results. Figure 10 shows results for a sample simulation of the
benchmark model. ... We see that the model produces bursts of entry, particularly
in reaction to changes in the aggregate shock a, which are larger than those observed
in the data. Part of this is smoothed out by time aggregation, however.
The results of two sample simulations of the model without the financial friction
and without shocks to aggregate profitability are shown in Figures 1-11 and 1-12
. In Figure 1-11 the only exogenous variation comes from changes in a. The first
panel shows unemployment and GDP. The comovement between the two series is
strong (the correlation between the two series in -0.995). For this reason the model is
unable to generate jobless recoveries. An increase in unemployment can only result
from a low realization of the aggregate shock a. However, once a returns to its
unconditional mean the unemployment rate reverts back to its pre-recession value
almost immediately. The second panel shows the mass of entrants, which reacts
strongly to changes in a. In fact, the procyclicality of entry is around 60% larger
than in the data. The last panel shows the true and the approximated laws of motion
41
0 50 100 150 200 250
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 m
ea
n
Unemployment and GDP
 
 
0 50 100 150 200 250
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 m
ea
n
Mass of entrants
0 50 100 150 200 250
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Th
et
a
True vs. Approximated θ
 
 
Unemployment
GDP
True θ
Appr. θ
Figure 1-12: Sample simulation when the only shocks are to HPI. The first panel
shows unemployment and GDP. The second panel shows the mass of entrants, and
the last panel shows the true and approximated values of ✓.
of ✓. The series are almost indistinguishable as labor market tightness ✓ moves virually
1:1 with the aggregate state. Figure 1-12 shows a simulation of the model when a is
fixed at its unconditional mean. The only exogenous variation comes from movements
in qh. The first panel highlights that those exogenous shocks cause variations in the
unemployment rate, while having almost no e↵ect on GDP. As was discussed above,
this is the main feature of the model which generates jobless recoveries. The mass of
entrants, plotted in the second panel is much less volatile compared to the previous
case where all exogenous shocks occured via a. Finally, the true and approximated
law of motion of ✓ are shown in the third panel. Again, the fit is very good (see
Appendix A.3 for details).
1.7 Conclusion
The recent recession which lasted from the end of 2007 until mid-2009 was severe in
many respects. Because the unemployment rate remains far above its pre-crisis level
the recovery has been described as jobless. Second, the recession was accompanied
by an unprecedented fall in the value of real estate. In this paper I claim that these
two facts are related. As the main channel through which house prices can exert this
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influence on the unemployment rates I propose the process of lending to new firms.
The model captures the idea that start-ups require external financing, for which real
estate is used as collateral. As the value of this collateral falls, start-up costs increase
and the number of new firms declines.
The number of start-ups in the US has fallen by over 20% since 2007. Never since
the beginning of the data series in 1977 have there been as few openings of new firms
or as few jobs created through firm birth than in 2010 and 2011. Young firms’ below-
trend job creation can account for almost all of the persistently high unemployment
rate after the end of the recession.
I calibrate and compute a quantitative competitive industry model with endoge-
nous entry and exit, firm heterogeneity, labor adjustment costs, and aggregate shocks.
This model is able to match key moments of the firm distribution and employment at
the micro- and macro-level. It captures the importance of new firms for employment
and generates a jobless recovery. The model is able to explain over 80% of the increase
and persistence in unemployment since 2007. I find that the e↵ects of a ‘technology
shock’ alone on the unemployment rate are neither strong nor persistent enough to
fit the US data. I estimate that absent the deterioration of value of real estate, the
increase in the unemployment rate would have been at around 40% of the actual
increase. Furthermore, my mechanism generates a realistic procyclicality and time
series variation in entry rates, something that previous studies have had di culties
with. Entry emerges as an important factor for the propagation of aggregate shocks.
In contrast to previous studies my framework establishes a structural link between
house prices, entrepreneurial activity, and the jobless recovery. This setup is suited
to explain why start-up job creation began to decrease prior to the recent recession,
and why - contrary to older, incumbent firms - it remains at low levels.
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Chapter 2
Capital Reallocation and
Aggregate Productivity
2.1 Motivation
Frictions in the reallocation of capital and labor are important for understanding ag-
gregate productivity. With heterogenous plants, the assignment of capital, labor and
other inputs across production sites impacts directly on aggregate productivity. Fric-
tions in the reallocation process thus lead to the misallocation of factors of production
(relative to a frictionless benchmark). This point lies at the heart of the analysis of
productivity across countries in Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Bartelsman et al. (2013)
and Restuccia and Rogerson (2008).1
In this paper we consider the cyclical dimension of reallocation in the pres-
ence of capital adjustment costs. In important empirical contributions, Eisfeldt and
Rampini (2006) and Kehrig (2011) show that capital reallocation is pro-cyclical and
that the cross-sectional productivity dispersion behaves counter-cyclically.2 This not
only underlines the importance of heterogeneity in the production sector but also
suggests that frictions in the adjustment to capital may produce cyclical e↵ects on
output over the business cycle. One contribution of this paper is to specify a dynamic
equilibrium model to further understand these findings about cyclical reallocation and
dispersion in productivities.
Not properly taking cross-sectional heterogeneity into account will also lead to a
mis-measurement of total factor productivity (TFP). We are interested in the cyclical
1More specific di↵erences with these and other studies are discussed below.
2Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) use dispersion in firm level Tobin’s Q, dispersion in firm level
investment rates, dispersion in total factor productivity growth rates, and dispersion in capacity uti-
lization. Kehrig (2011) constructs dispersion measures based on TFP estimates using the estimation
strategy in Olley and Pakes (1996).
45
component of the output loss resulting from frictions in the adjustment process which
will be reflected in a mis-measured TFP. This relates to the question how micro-
frictions like physical adjustment costs translate into aggregate outcomes. We find
that if the only shocks in the economy are to aggregate TFP, then the
productivity loss from costly reallocation has no cyclical element. This
is consistent with results on the aggregate implications of lumpy investment, as in
Thomas (2002), Khan and Thomas (2003) and Gourio and Kashyap (2007). If an
aggregate model behaves as if there were no non-convexities at the plant-level, then
the distortions in the allocation of capital across plants with di↵erent productivities
will matter only for aggregate levels. As a result, the distribution over plants’ capital
stock and idiosyncratic productivity can be extremely well approximated by its first
moment.
In addition to shocks to TFP, we also study shocks to plants’ investment oppor-
tunities as in Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006), together with shocks to the distribution
of idiosyncratic productivity as in Bloom (2009), Bloom et al. (2012), Gilchrist et
al. (2014), or Bachmann and Bayer (2013). Those shocks create cyclical move-
ments in reallocation and productivity as well as time-varying productivity
dispersion. Cross-sectional heterogeneity now plays an important role for
shaping aggregate dynamics. In the presence of those shocks, reallocation is cor-
related with measured aggregate productivity. The cross-sectional joint distribution
over plants’ capital stock and idiosyncratic productivity is a slow-moving object in
this environment and tracking its evolution only by its first moment is insu cient:
higher order moments are needed to characterize the outcome of the planner’s prob-
lem, in particular the covariance of the cross-sectional distribution between plants’
capital stocks and profitability.
Importantly these features of our model are interrelated. The fact that the covari-
ance matters as a moment for determining the optimal allocation is indicative of the
significance of reallocation e↵ects. If this covariance did not matter for describing op-
timal allocations, for example because it is constant over time or perfectly correlated
with the mean, then it could not have a cyclical e↵ect on aggregate output. Thus
the covariance that matters from the perspective of the Krusell and Smith (1998)
approach is precisely the moment that reflects gains to capital reallocation.
This last point is worth stressing. Studies following Krusell and Smith (1998)
routinely find that only first moments of distributions are needed to summarize cross
sectional distributions. In our economy, the covariance of the cross sectional distribu-
tion between a plant’s capital and its profitability is needed in the state space of the
problem. When there are shocks either to the capital adjustment process or to the
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cross sectional distribution, this covariance evolves in response to these shocks. In
the presence of such shocks the approximate solution to the planner’s problem using
only average capital fails: the solution requires higher order moments.
As a final exercise, we study the business cycle properties of an economy driven
by shocks to adjustment rates and to the cross sectional distribution of idiosyncratic
shocks assuming constant aggregate total factor productivity.3 This exercise provides
a basis for “adverse” aggregate productivity shocks and the serial correlation of the
Solow residual. The aggregate moments produced by this economy are very
similar to the moments of the standard stochastic growth model. In par-
ticular: (i) the Solow residual is pro-cyclical and positively serially correlated, (ii)
consumption, investment and output are positively correlated, (iii) consumption is
smoothed, (iv) reallocation is pro-cyclical and (v) the standard deviation of produc-
tivity across plants is counter-cyclical. The first three properties match those of the
standard RBC model. The last two properties match those stressed by Eisfeldt and
Rampini (2006) and Kehrig (2011). In our setting a reduction in the Solow residual
comes from variations in the distribution of shocks, not an adverse shock to total
factor productivity.
2.2 Frictionless Economy
To fix basic ideas and notation, start with an economy with heterogeneity and no
frictions. The planner maximizes
V (A,K) = maxK0,k(") u(c) +  EA0|AV (A0, K 0) (2.1)
for all (A,K). The constraints are
c+K 0 = y + (1   )K, (2.2)
ˆ
"
k(")f(")d" = K, (2.3)
y = A
ˆ
"
"k(")↵f(")d("). (2.4)
The objective function is the lifetime utility of the representative household. The
state vector has two elements: A is aggregate TFP and K is the aggregate stock of
3This analysis shares some features with Bloom et al. (2012) and Bachmann and Bayer (2013).
Di↵erences and similarities are made clear in the next sections.
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capital. There is a distribution of plant specific productivity shocks, f(") which is
fixed and hence omitted from the state vector.
There are two controls in (2.1). The first is the choice of aggregate capital for the
next period. The second is the assignment function, k("), which allocates the given
stock of capital across the production sites, indexed by their current productivity.
At the beginning of the period, A as well as the idiosyncratic productivity shocks "
realize. While aggregate capital K requires one period time-to-build, the reallocation
of existing capital takes place instantaneously and is given by k(").
The resource constraint for the accumulation of aggregate capital is given in (2.2).
The constraint for the allocation of capital across production sites in given in (2.3),
where f(·) is the distribution function for ".
From (2.4), total output, y, is the sum of the output across production sites. The
production function at any site is
y(k,A, ") = A"k↵ (2.5)
where k is the capital used at the site with productivity ".4 The idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity " is persistent, parameterized by ⇢" 2 [0, 1]. We assume ↵ < 1 as in Lucas
(1978).5 In this frictionless environment, a plants’ optimal capital stock is entirely
determined by ".
The assumption of diminishing returns to scale, ↵ < 1, implies that the allocation
of capital across production sites is non-trivial. There are gains to allocating capital
to high productivity sites but there are also gains, due to ↵ < 1, from spreading
capital across production sites.
Let k(") = ⇠(")K, so that ⇠(") is the fraction of the capital stock going to a plant
with productivity ". Then (2.4) becomes:
y = AK↵
ˆ
"
"⇠(")↵f(")d(") = AK↵(µ+  ) (2.6)
4Labor and other inputs are not made explicit. One interpretation is that these inputs have no
adjustment costs and are optimally chosen each period, given the state. In this case, the marginal
product of labor (and other inputs) will be equal across production sites. This does not imply
equality of the marginal products of capital. Adding labor adjustment, perhaps interactive with
capital adjustment, would be a natural extension of our model. Presumably, adding labor frictions
would enhance our results. Bloom et al. (2012) include labor adjustment costs while Bachmann and
Bayer (2013) assume flexible labor.
5As in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006a), estimates of ↵ are routinely below unity. This is inter-
preted as reflecting both diminishing returns to scale in production and market power due to product
di↵erentiation. For simplicity, our model ignores product di↵erentiation and treats the curvature as
reflecting diminishing returns. The analysis in Kehrig (2011) includes product di↵erentiation at the
level of intermediate goods.
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where µ = "¯
´
" ⇠(")
↵f(")d(") and   = Cov(", ⇠(")↵).6 As is well understood from the
Olley and Pakes (1996) analysis of productivity, aggregate output will depend on the
covariance between the plant-level productivity and the factor allocation.
In the frictionless economy with time invariant distribution f(") and costless real-
location of capital, this covariance is constant so that the joint distribution of plant-
specific capital and " is not part of the state vector. As this analysis progresses, this
will not always be the case.
2.2.1 Optimal Choices
Within a period, the condition for the optimal allocation of capital across production
sites is given by ↵A"k(")↵ 1 = ⌘ for all ", where ⌘ is the multiplier on (2.3). This
condition is intuitive: absent frictions, the optimal allocation equates the marginal
product of capital across production sites.
Working with this condition,
k(") =
⌘
↵A"
1
↵ 1
. (2.7)
Using (2.3),
⌘ = A↵K↵ 1
✓ˆ
"
"
1
1 ↵f(")d"
◆1 ↵
. (2.8)
The multiplier is the standard marginal product on an additional unit of capital times
the e↵ect of the " distribution on productivity.
Putting these two conditions together,
k(") = K
"
1
1 ↵´
" "
1
1 ↵f(")d"
. (2.9)
Substituting into (2.4) yields
y = AK↵
✓ˆ
"
"
1
1 ↵f(")d"
◆1 ↵
. (2.10)
This is a standard aggregate production function, AK↵, augmented by a term that
captures a “love of variety” e↵ect from the optimal allocation of capital across plants.
With a given distribution f(·) the idiosyncratic shocks magnify average aggregate
productivity as the planner can reallocate inputs to the more productive sites.
6This uses E(XY ) = EX ⇥ EY + cov(X,Y ), where "¯ is the mean of the plant-specific shock.
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The condition for intertemporal optimality is u0(c) =  EVK(A0, K 0) so that
the marginal cost and expected marginal gains of additional capital are equated.
Using (2.1), this condition becomes
u0(c) =  Eu0(c0)
"
(1   ) + A0↵K 0↵ 1
✓ˆ
"
"
1
1 ↵f(")d"
◆1 ↵#
. (2.11)
The left side is the marginal cost of accumulating an additional unit of capital. The
right side is the discounted marginal gain of capital accumulation. Part of this gain
comes from having an extra unit of capital to allocate across production sites in
the following period. The productivity from these production sites depend ons two
factors, the future values of: aggregate productivity, A0 and the cross sectional dis-
tribution of idiosyncratic shocks, f(").
The choice of k for each plant within a period is independent of the choice be-
tween consumption and saving. The planner optimally allocates capital to maximize
the level of output and then allocates output between consumption and capital accu-
mulation. Clearly, once we allow for limits to reallocation, the capital accumulation
decision will depend upon the future allocation of capital across production sites. In
this way, variations in the distribution of f(·) can impact on the capital accumulation
choice.
2.2.2 Aggregate Output and Productivity
For this economy, there is an interesting way to represent total output. This is seen
from defining
A˜ ⌘ A
ˆ
"
"k(")↵f(")d" (2.12)
so that
y = A˜K↵. (2.13)
from (2.4).
Researchers interested in measuring TFP from the aggregate data will typically
uncover A˜ rather than A. This is the mis-measurement referred to earlier. As the
discussion progresses, we will refer to A˜ as the Solow residual, as distinct from ag-
gregate TFP.7 There are three factors which influence A˜. The first one is A. The
influence of A, aggregate TFP, on A˜, measured TFP, the Solow residual is direct and
has been central to many studies of aggregate fluctuations. Second, the distribution
f("). Variations in f(") influence A˜ because variations in the cross sectional distri-
7Thanks for Susanto Basu for urging us to make these terms clear.
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bution of the idiosyncratic shocks lead to di↵erent marginal productivities of plants
and thus changes in the Solow residual. Finally, there is the allocation of factors, k.
If factors are optimally allocated, then the distribution of capital over plants does
not have an independent e↵ect on A˜. However, the existence of frictions may imply
that, in a static sense, capital is not e ciently allocated. In that case, even with f(")
fixed, the reallocation process will lead to variations in A˜.8
Starting with Olley and Pakes (1996), many researchers have recognized the de-
pendence of aggregate productivity on factor allocation. In many studies the un-
derlying frictions are due to policies which influence steady state productivity across
countries.9 Our analysis di↵ers from these studies in a couple of important ways. We
next focus on (i) frictions through adjustment costs to capital, (ii) dynamic ine -
ciency brought about through the adjustment process so that the magnitude of the
ine ciency and thus aggregate productivity are endogenous and (iii) the behavior of
aggregate productivity over business cycles.
2.3 Capital Adjustment Costs
The allocation of capital over sites with heterogeneous idiosyncratic productivity has
important e↵ects on measured total factor productivity. In a frictionless economy
there are no cyclical e↵ects of reallocation on productivity. However, there is ample
evidence in the literature for both non-convex and convex adjustment costs. Introduc-
ing these adjustment costs will enrich the analysis of productivity and reallocation.10
There are two distinct frictions to study, corresponding to the two dimensions of
capital adjustment. The first is “costly reallocation” in which the friction is associated
with the allocation of capital across the production sites. The second is “costly
accumulation” in which the adjustment cost refers to the cost of accumulating rather
than allocating capital.
Our focus here lies on studying the presence of costs to the reallocation (assign-
ment) process. We introduce a special type of adjustment costs that is very tractable,
although not very informative about the source of the friction. Following Calvo (1983)
8This decomposition of productivity taken from Olley and Pakes (1996) highlights the interaction
between the distribution of productivity and factors of production across firms. Gourio and Miao
(2010) use a version of this argument, see their equation (45), to study the e↵ects of dividend taxes
on productivity. Khan and Thomas (2008) study individual choice problems and aggregation in
the frictionless model with plant specific shocks. Basu and Fernald (1997) also discuss the role of
reallocation for productivity in an aggregate model.
9Bartelsman et al. (2013) discuss these other studies in their analysis of productivity di↵erences
over 24 economies.
10In contrast to ?, there are no borrowing frictions. They argue that these frictions do not create
large losses in aggregate productivity.
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and more recently adopted to study investment decisions by Sveen and Weinke (2005),
assume that each period a Bernoulli draw determines the fraction ⇡ 2 [0, 1] of plants
the planner can costlessly reallocate capital between. This represents a stochastic
investment opportunity. The remaining fraction of plants 1   ⇡ produces with its
beginning-of-period capital stock. This structure of adjustment costs captures the
fact that plants adjust their capital stock infrequently. Applying a law of large num-
bers, the plant-specific shocks " are assumed to be equally distributed over the frac-
tions ⇡ and 1   ⇡ of adjustable and non-adjustable plants. The two distributions of
plants will be referred to as F a and F n. This also implies that E(") is time-invariant
and the same across adjustable and non-adjustable plants.
By assumption, ⇡ is not dependent on the state of the plant. This simplification
makes our analysis tractable. At the same time it does not preclude a role for the
cross sectional distribution in the state space of the problem. Besides tractability,
there are other arguments for this specification.
First, a model with just non-convex adjustment costs, or a mixture of non-convex
and quadratic adjustment costs, as in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006a), captures
inaction and bursts of investment but misses small adjustments. While not as elegant
as the state dependent adjustment model, the constant hazard structure does generate
inaction, bursts of investment as well as smaller adjustment rates. A similar point
about price adjustment is used in Midrigan (2011) to justify a constant adjustment
rate specification11
Second, the focus of our analysis is on (2.12): the impact of the cross sectional dis-
tribution of profitability shocks on the Solow residual and thus output. The constant
hazard assumption allows us to isolate the e↵ects of the cross sectional distribution
through its e↵ects on the allocation of capital and hence output rather than through
adjustment costs alone. This does not deny the significance of adjustment costs but
rather focuses solely on the output e↵ects of the cross sectional distribution. There is
an important cost to this specification: there is no option value of waiting. In a model
with non-stochastic fixed costs, if adjustment is not made in the current period, it is
available for sure in the next one. Once adjustment costs are stochastic, the option
value of waiting is reduced.
2.3.1 The Planner’s Problem
For the dynamic program of the planner in the presence of adjustment costs, the
state vector contains aggregate productivity A, the aggregate capital stock K, and
11See also Costain and Nakov (2013).
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 . The high-dimensional object   describes the joint distribution over capital (at
the start of the period) and productivity shocks across plants.   is needed in the
state vector because the presence of adjustment costs implies that a plant’s capital
stock may not reflect the current draw of ". As noted above, there is time variation
in the probability of adjustment ⇡. Furthermore, there are shocks to the variance
of idiosyncratic productivity shocks, parameterized by  . Changes in the variance
of the cross-sectional idiosyncratic productivity, as recently highlighted in Bloom
(2009) and Gilchrist et al. (2014), have an e↵ect on output. Such changes can be
interpreted as variations in uncertainty. Consider a mean-preserving spread (MPS)
in the distribution of ". In a frictionless economy such a spread would incentivize
the planner to carry out more reallocation of capital between plants because capital
can be employed in highly productive sites. Let s = (A,K, , , ⇡) denote the vector
of aggregate state variables. Note the assumed timing: changes in the distribution
of idiosyncratic shocks are known in the period they occur, not in advance.12 The
adjustment status of a plant is given by j = a, n, where a stands for ‘adjustment’,
while n stands for ‘non-adjustment’.
Given the state, the planner makes an investment decision K 0 and chooses how
much capital to reallocate across those plants whose capital stock can be costlessly
reallocated, (k, ") 2 a. Let k˜j(k, ", s) for j = a, n denote the capital allocation to a
plant that enters the period with capital k and profitability shock " in group j after
reallocation. The capital of a plant in group j = a is adjusted and is optimally set
by the planner to the level k˜a(k, ", s). The capital of a plant in group j = n is not
adjusted so that k˜n(k, ", s) = k.
The choice problem of the planner is:
V (A,K, , , ⇡) = maxk˜a(k,",s),K0 u(c) +  E[A0, 0, 0,⇡0|A, , ,⇡]V (A
0, K 0, 0, 0, ⇡0) (2.14)
subject to the resource constraint (2.2) and
y =
ˆ
(k,")2Fa
A"k˜a(k, ", s)
↵d (k, ") +
ˆ
(k,")2Fn
A"k˜n(k, ", s)
↵d (k, "), (2.15)
which is simply (2.4) split into adjustable and non-adjustable plants. Here F j is the
set of plants in group j = a, n. The fraction of plants whose capital stock can be
12Other models, such as Bloom et al. (2012), include future values of   in the current state as
a way to generate a reduction in activity in the face of greater uncertainty about the future. We
include the implications of this alternative timing as part of the results below.
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adjusted is equal to ⇡
ˆ
(k,")2Fa
f(")d" = ⇡ (2.16)
and the amount of capital over all plants must sum to total capital K:
⇡
ˆ
(k,")2Fa
k˜a(k, ", s)d (k, ") + (1  ⇡)
ˆ
(k,")2Fn
k˜n(k, ", s)d (k, ") = K. (2.17)
As the capital is plant specific, it is necessary to specify transition equations at the
plant level. Let i = K
0 K
K denote the gross investment rate so that K
0 = (1   + i)K
is the aggregate capital accumulation equation. To distinguish reallocation from
aggregate capital accumulation, assume that the capital at all plants, regardless of
their reallocation status, have the same capital accumulation. The transition for the
capital (after reallocation) this period and the initial plant-specific capital next period
is given by
k0j(k, ", s) = (1    + i)k˜j(k, ", s), (2.18)
for j = a, n. Due to the presence of frictions k˜a(k, ", s) is not given by (2.9). Notice
that A a↵ects unadjustable and adjustable plants in the same way. This implies
that the optimal reallocation decision will occur independently of A. The shock to
A will have an e↵ect on the mis-measured part of TFP only in the presence of a
capital accumulation problem, since the total amount of capital in adjustable and
non-adjustable plants may di↵er.
The quantitative analysis will focus on reallocation of capital, defined as the frac-
tion of total capital that is moved between adjustable plants within a period. Follow-
ing a new realization of idiosyncratic productivity shocks, the planner will reallocate
capital from less productive to more productive sites. Aggregate output is thus in-
creasing in the amount of capital reallocation.
As k˜a(k, ", s) denotes the post-reallocation capital stock of a plant with initial cap-
ital k, the plant-level reallocation rate would be r(k, ", s) = | k˜a(k,",s) kk |. Aggregating
over all the plants who adjust, the aggregate reallocation rate is
R(s) ⌘ 0.5
ˆ
(k,")2Fa
r(k, ", s)d (k, "). (2.19)
The multiplication by 0.5 is simply to avoid double counting flows between adjusting
plants.
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2.3.2 Joint Distribution of Capital and Productivity
In the presence of reallocation frictions, the state space of the problem includes the
cross sectional distribution,  . Consequently, when making investment and realloca-
tion decisions the planner needs to forecast  0. It is computationally not feasible to
follow the joint distribution of capital and profitability shocks over plants, we rep-
resent the joint distribution by several of its moments. These forecast the marginal
benefit of investment.
The right set of moments is suggested by the following expression for aggregate
output, taken from (2.15)
y = ⇡("¯µa +  a) + (1  ⇡)("¯µn +  n), (2.20)
where µj ⌘ E(k˜j(k, ", s)↵) and  j ⌘ Cov(", k˜j(k, ", s)↵), for j = a, n. Instead of   we
retain µn and  n in the state vector of (2.14).
These two moments contain all the necessary information about the joint dis-
tribution of capital and profitability among non-adjustable plants. The information
about capital in plants in FA is not needed since capital in those plants can be freely
adjusted, independently of their current capital stock. Together, µn and  n are suf-
ficient to compute the output of those plants whose capital cannot be reallocated
and thus to solve the planner’s optimization problem. Note that by keeping µn and
 n in the state space, we are not approximating the joint distribution over capital
and productivity since the two moments can account for all the variation of the joint
distribution. This feature of our choice of moments allows us to compare it with
common approximation techniques in the spirit of Krusell and Smith (1998).
The covariance term  n is crucial for understanding the impact of reallocation on
measures of aggregate productivity. If the covariance is indispensable in the state
vector of the planner, then the model is not isomorphic to the stochastic growth
model. That is, if the covariance is part of the state vector, then the existence
of heterogeneous plants along with capital adjustment costs matters for aggregate
variables like investment over the business cycle.
When either A or ⇡ is stochastic, it is possible to follow the evolution of these mo-
ments analytically.13 The choice of k˜a for adjustable plants, along with the respective
" shocks at these plants, maps into values of the moments µa and  a. Together with
the new realization of exogenous shocks at the beginning of the next period these
map into the next period moments µ0n and  
0
n. The laws of motion for the two states
13The analytics hold for the evolution of the mean, (2.21), but not the covariance, (2.22), when  
is stochastic.
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µn and  n are given by
µ0n = ⇡
0µa + (1  ⇡0)µn (2.21)
and
 0n = ⇡
0⇢" a + (1  ⇡0)⇢" n. (2.22)
Together these laws of motion define the law of motion of the joint distribution  ,
allowing us to follow the evolution of this component of the aggregate state.14 Equa-
tions (2.20)-(2.22) permit us to study the trade-o↵ regarding the optimal allocation
of capital across sites. The planner can increase contemporaneous output by real-
locating capital from low- to high-productivity sites in F a. This will increase the
covariance between profitability and capital,  a, while at the same time decreasing
µa because ↵ < 1. A fraction 1  ⇢⇡ of currently adjustable plants will not be able to
adjust its capital stock tomorrow. The planner therefore has to trade o↵ the higher
instantaneous output from reallocation with the higher probability of a mismatch
between k˜n(k, ", s) = k and the realization of "0 for plants in F n tomorrow. This is
captured in the laws of motion (2.21) and (2.22).
2.3.3 Stationary Equilibria
To fix ideas we can analyze the stationary economy where ⇡ and   are not varying
over time. In this environment a stationary distribution  ⇤ exists. Using (2.21) it
follows that µn = µa = µ⇤. Furthermore, stationary values  ⇤a and  
⇤
n exist. Using
(2.22) one can show that  n converges to
 ⇤n =  
⇤
a
⇡⇢"
1  (1  ⇡)⇢" . (2.23)
Hence (2.20) becomes
y = "¯µ⇤ + ⇤ ⇤a, (2.24)
where ⇤ ⌘ ⇡1 (1 ⇡)⇢" is a function of parameters. ⇤ is (weakly) increasing in both ⇡ and
⇢".15 Intuitively, an increase in ⇡ increases total output because more plants’ capital
stock can be costlessly adjusted. An increase in ⇢", the persistence of idiosyncratic
productivity shocks, implies that the probability of a plant switching status and being
14Note that  0 = Cov(k(")↵, "0) is an expectation. The term "0 is made up of two components,
one is the persistent part, and one is an i.i.d. part, denoted ⌘. Rewrite "0 = ⇢""+(1 ⇢")⌘ to obtain
 0 = Cov(k(")↵, ⇢""+ (1  ⇢")⌘) = ⇢" .
15Formally, @⇤@⇡ =
1 ⇢"
[1 (1 ⇡)⇢"]2   0,
@⇤
@⇢"
= ⇡(1 ⇡)
[1 (1 ⇡)⇢"]2   0. The cross-derivatives are given by
@2⇤
@⇢"@⇡
= @
2⇤
@⇡@⇢"
= 1
[1 (1 ⇡)⇢"]2  
2⇡
[1 (1 ⇡)⇢"]3 .
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Figure 2-1: Values of µ and  a in stationary equilibrium for various ⇡. Economy with
  = 1 and ⇢" = .9
non-adjustable with a mismatch between " and k is decreased.16
Figure 2-1 shows equilibrium values of µ⇤ and  ⇤a in stationary economies for
di↵erent values of ⇡. As ⇡ ! 0 the planner reallocates less capital between plants.
A value of µ⇤ = 1 implies  ⇤a = 0, because k(") = 1 for all sites, meaning that the
capital level is independent of ". On the other hand, as the fraction of adjustable
plants increases,  ⇤a increases.
2.4 Quantitative Results
With exogenous movements in ⇡ and   no stationary distribution of   exists and the
two moments µn and  n become part of the state vector. This problem can no longer
be solved analytically. This section presents quantitative results.
In the stationary economy, reallocation e↵ects only mattered for aggregate levels.
When are reallocation e↵ects likely to play a role for aggregate dynamics? One key
prerequisite is that the economy be subject to shocks that cause the distribution   to
16In the extreme case of iid shocks to idiosyncratic productivity shocks the planner would be
more reluctant to allocate large amounts of capital to high-productivity sites, decreasing aggregate
output.
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move over time. Without movements in   the benefits from reallocation are constant
and the covariance term   is not required to forecast  0. The reasons why   may vary
and the implications of its variability will be clear as the analysis proceeds.
In keeping with the distinction noted earlier between reallocation and accumula-
tion, the initial quantitative analysis, presented in section 2.4.1 is for an economy with
a fixed capital stock, thus highlighting reallocation. The economy is then enriched to
allow for capital accumulation in section 2.4.2.
For each of these models, this section focuses on the e↵ects of capital reallocation
on aggregate productivity. In addition, we present evidence on whether higher order
moments are needed in the solution of the planner’s optimization problem in Section
2.5. As highlighted in the introduction, these two themes are connected: higher order
moments are needed to follow the evolution of   precisely when capital reallocation
matters for the cyclical movements in productivity.
We solve the model at a quarterly frequency, using these baseline parameters.
Following the estimates in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006a), we set ↵ = 0.6.17 We
assume log-utility and a depreciation rate   = 0.025. Assuming an annual interest
rate of 4% implies a discount factor   = 0.987. We set the mean of ⇡ to ⇡¯ = 0.5. This
implies that plants adjust their capital stock on average every two quarters. Sveen
and Weinke (2005) treat changes in the capital stock of under 10% in absolute value
as maintenance and hence use ⇡ = 0.08. In our setup, the choice of ⇡ mainly a↵ects
aggregate levels, not transitions. Aggregate profitability takes the form of an AR(1)
in logs
ln at = ⇢a ln at 1 + ⌫a,t, ⌫a ⇠ N(0,  a), (2.25)
where ⇢a = 0.9 and  a = 0.005. Idiosyncratic profitability shocks are log-normal and
evolve according to a law of motion with time-varying variance
ln "t = ⇢" ln "t 1 +  t⌫",t, ⌫",t ⇠ N(0,  "). (2.26)
The parameters of the idiosyncratic shock process are ⇢" = 0.9 and  " = 0.2. The
parameter   governs the mean-preserving spread of the normal distribution from
which idiosyncratic profitability " is drawn. It has a mean of 1 and variance   
 t = ⇢  t 1 + ⌫ ,t, ⌫ ,t ⇠ N(1,   ). (2.27)
17This curvature is 0.44 in Bachmann and Bayer (2013) and 0.4 in Bloom et al. (2012).
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We set ⇢  = 0.82 as in Gilchrist et al. (2014). Finally, the process of ⇡ follows
⇡t = ⇢⇡⇡t 1 + ⌫⇡,t, ⌫⇡,t ⇠ N(⇡¯,  ⇡), (2.28)
with ⇢⇡ = 0.9. In order to be able to compare the e↵ect of di↵erent shocks, the
standard deviations of the innovations,  ⇡ = 0.03 and    = 0.014 are set to generate
the same amount of variation in output as shocks to A. Section 2.4.4 explores the
sensitivity of our findings to this parameterization. The number of plants is set at
10,000 for these simulations. The computational strategy is discussed in further detail
in the Appendix.
2.4.1 Capital Reallocation
Table 2.1 shows measures of the e ciency of the allocation of capital and the cycli-
cality of the Solow residual. These two aspects of the economy are inherently linked.
Aggregate productivity is endogenous and responds to changes in the amount of cap-
ital reallocated.
The column labeled ‘R/R⇤’ for ‘Reallocation’ measures the time series average
of the cross-sectional reallocation of capital across plants as defined in (2.19), rel-
ative to the frictionless benchmark without adjustment costs. The column labeled
Et( i(arpkit)) measures the time series average of the cross sectional standard devi-
ation of the average revenue product of capital. The column labeled G shows the
output gap, defined as G(s) = y
FL(s) y(s)
yFL(s) , output in state s relative to the friction-
less benchmark.18 The column labeled  (A˜/A) reports the standard deviation of the
Solow residual relative to TFP. The columns C(R, A˜) and C( i(arpkit), A˜) show the
correlation between the Solow residual and respectively capital reallocation and the
standard deviation of the average revenue product of capital. These two columns pro-
vide a link back to the facts, noted in the introduction, about the cyclical behavior
of reallocation and dispersion in productivity.
The first block of Table 2.1 reports results for the frictionless economy. The second
block of results introduces capital adjustment costs.
Frictionless Economy
The first row of Table 2.1 shows the results for the frictionless economy, ⇡ = 1,
without time series variations in TFP, the volatility of the idiosyncratic shocks  ,
18The frictionless output yFL(s) is a function of s because changes in   a↵ect the output achieved
in the frictionless case.
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Case R/R⇤ Et( i(arpkit)) G  (A˜/A) C(R, A˜) C( i(arpkit), A˜)
Frictionless
nonstochastic 1
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
na
( )
na
( )
stochastic A 1
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
na
( )
na
( )
stochastic   1
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0.083
(0.002)
0.950
(0.006)
na
( )
Frictions
nonstochastic 0.491
(0)
1.09
(0)
0.106
(0)
0
(0)
na
( )
na
( )
stochastic A 0.491
(0)
1.09
(0)
0.106
(0)
0
(0)
na
( )
na
( )
stochastic ⇡ 0.487
(0.008)
1.09
(0.007)
0.110
(0.001)
0.077
(0.004)
0.995
(0.004)
 0.977
(0.002)
stochastic   0.491
(3.68e 06)
1.09
(0.01)
0.106
(7e 05)
0.064
(0.001)
0.936
(0.005)
0.929
(0.006)
stochastic ⇡,  0.492
(0.005)
1.09
(0.006)
0.108
(0.0008)
0.10
(0.003)
0.817
(0.012)
 0.194
(0.03)
Table 2.1: Capital Reallocation Model: Productivity Implications
Results from 100 simulations with T=1000, standard deviations in parentheses below. RR⇤ measures the
time series average of the cross-sectional reallocation of capital across plants, relative to the frictionless
benchmark, R⇤. Et( i(arpkit)) is the mean standard deviation of the average revenue product of capital.
G refers to the output gap relative to the frictionless benchmark. The column  (A˜/A) shows the standard
deviation of measured vs. real TFP. The last columns C(R, A˜) and C( i(arpkit), A˜) show the correlation
between mismeasured TFP and respectively capital reallocation and the standard deviation of the average
revenue product of capital. The “na” entry means that the correlation is not meaningful as one of the
variables is constant.
or the fraction of adjustable sites ⇡.19 This case serves as a benchmark. Without
frictions, the marginal product of capital is equalized across plants and our measure
of the ine ciency of the capital allocation, Et( i(arpkit)), is zero. The first-best
output is achieved. The mis-measurement of TFP is constant. The amount of capital
reallocation is time-invariant and hence plays no role for aggregate productivity.
The second row, ‘stochastic A’ introduces variation in aggregate profitability. Vari-
ations in A have no e↵ect on the reallocation of capital in this economy, because the
planner reallocates capital across plants within a period. Consequently the amount
of reallocation is the same as without variations in A. The allocation is e cient, A˜
varies only with A. The only di↵erence with respect to the benchmark in the previous
row is the variability of output, which is driven by changes in aggregate profitability.
Since A enters total output multiplicatively all variation in output stems from vari-
ation in A. There is no endogenous propagation. As before, the amount of capital
reallocation is time-invariant.
19In this abbreviated problem, the planner solves V ( ) = maxk(") u(c) +  EV ( 
0) subject to
the resource constraint (2.2) and total production given by (2.15).
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The third row ‘stochastic  ’ presents results for the frictionless economy with
stochastic variance of idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The parameter   is chosen
to generate the same coe cient of variation of output as the previous case.20 The
resulting allocation has the same rate of reallocation as the benchmark and the cross
sectional distribution of the average revenue product of capital is degenerate. Impor-
tantly, output and the Solow residual vary with  , as shown in column  (A˜/A). This
represents a pure reallocation e↵ect through changes in f(") and occurs even under
constant A and ⇡. The second to last column shows the high correlation between
the amount of capital reallocation and output. The correlation is not equal to one
because following a shock to  , the subsequent change in the planner’s chosen alloca-
tion of capital produces an overshooting of output. This is a result of the allocation
of capital among non-adjustable plants.
This economy presents the simplest case where reallocation is the sole driver of
business cycles. To some degree, it looks like an economy driven by exogenous TFP.
Here the variations in productivity arise from the endogenous reallocation of capital.
The following subsection studies environments where capital adjustment costs amplify
this feature.
Costly Capital Reallocation
Setting ⇡ < 1 introduces capital adjustment costs to the frictionless economy, so that
only a fraction of all plants’ capital stocks can be adjusted within a given period.
Costly capital reallocation will have e↵ects on measured productivity and its cyclical
properties.
When ⇡ is non-stochastic and there are no other aggregate shocks, a station-
ary joint distribution   exists, with the moments (µn, n) constant, as was shown
in Section 2.3.3 above. Table 2.1 shows the results for this case in the row labeled
‘nonstochastic’. In this economy the fraction of capital reallocated is far below the
frictionless benchmark, as indicated in the second column. With R < ⇡, the planner’s
chosen distribution of capital over adjustable plants is di↵erent from the distribution
in the frictionless case. Although capital in a fraction ⇡ of plants could be cost-
lessly reallocated, the reallocation rate is less than ⇡. Instead, reallocation is lower
indicating a reduced capital flow beyond the direct influence of ⇡ < 1.
Figure 2-2 plots capital reallocation as a function of ⇡. The dashed line is the
20For this case,   takes values between 0.966 and 1.0344. These values are chosen to generate the
same amount of output volatility as direct shocks to A. Below we study the implications of larger
variability in  . Note that   > 1 can imply that some values of the shock become negative. To
avoid this, we apply the MPS to the underlying normal distribution and re-adjust its mean such
that mean of the log-normal is preserved.
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45  line. The concave solid green line above it shows capital reallocation between
adjustable plants (as a fraction of the frictionless benchmark). As ⇡ ! 1 it approaches
the allocation derived in (2.9). For total capital reallocation (plotted as the red solid
line beneath the 45  line) this implies that it approaches ⇡ as ⇡ ! 1.
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Figure 2-2: Capital Reallocation in adjustable and all plants as fraction of frictionless
benchmark in stationary equilibrium for various ⇡. Economy with   = 1 and ⇢ = .9.
The ine ciency of the allocation when ⇡ < 1 is highlighted by the column labeled
Et( i(arpkit)). This measure of the ine ciency of the allocation is larger than zero,
reflecting frictions in the reallocation process that stem from two sources. First, the
planner chooses not to equalize marginal products between adjustable plants, reflect-
ing the tradeo↵s discussed above. Secondly, the marginal products of capital among
non-adjustable plants exhibit a high degree of heterogeneity due to the fact that their
capital is fixed despite a new realization of idiosyncratic profitability. Because  n
and µn converge to their steady-state values output does not vary in this economy.
The output gap is positive, directly reflecting the impact of ⇡ < 1. Importantly, the
mis-measurement in TFP is constant over time, we only obtain a level-e↵ect.
The row labeled ‘stochastic A’ allows for randomness in aggregate productivity
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with constant ⇡. As explained above, the amount of reallocation is independent of
variations in A. Output and A˜ vary only with A. Because ⇡ < 1 the allocation is
characterized by a positive standard deviation of average revenue products of capital
and a positive output gap.
Variations in ⇡ create time series variation in the moments µn and  n, as shown
in the row ‘stochastic ⇡’. Fluctuations in ⇡ lead to pro-cyclical capital reallocation
patterns, as shown in column C(R, A˜). But this is not simply a correlation. In the
presence of adjustment frictions, reallocation causes the observed time-variations in
output. Variations in ⇡ therefore also lead to variations in (mis-measured) total fac-
tor productivity. The marginal products of capital are not equalized across plants,
neither among the adjustable nor the unadjustable sites. This results in a positive
output gap which varies with the evolution of µn and  n. This gap is about 11%
of real GDP. Additionally, this economy exhibits counter-cyclical productivity dis-
persion, as seen in the last column. When ⇡ is low, less capital can be reallocated
between adjustable plants. This decreases output and increases the standard devia-
tion of marginal products between those plants. Though   is held fixed,  i(arpkit)
nonetheless varies over time.
The row ‘stochastic  ’ of Table 2.1 studies the e↵ects of time-variation in f(") un-
der costly capital reallocation. Due to the presence of adjustment costs, the marginal
products of capital cannot be equalized over time. In addition, the variations in  
lead to changes in the optimal allocation decision by the planner and create consid-
erable time-variation in µn and  n. The resulting fluctuations in output stem from
di↵erent reallocation choices of the planner that show up in variations of the Solow
residual. While variations in ⇡ a↵ect output directly through the fraction of plants
among which capital can be reallocated, the e↵ect of changes in   is less direct. Vari-
ations in   induce di↵erent reallocation choices but a fraction of the e↵ect on output
comes from the fact that the marginal revenue product of capital is changed through
productivity draws with larger or smaller tails. As the last two columns show, shocks
to   lead to pro-cyclical reallocation patterns. At the same time they produce a
pro-cyclical dispersion in average revenue products of capital. A larger spread in the
distribution of shocks leads to more reallocation of capital among adjustable plants
by the planner and hence higher output. At the same time the increase in dispersion
leads to a larger standard deviation of the marginal products of capital, both among
adjustable and non-adjustable plants. This results is driven by the probability of a
mismatch between k and "0 for plants in F n.
The joint e↵ects of changes in ⇡ and   are presented in the last row of Table 2.1.
Output varies significantly over time, with variations resulting directly from both
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shocks to ⇡ and  . While ⇡ < 1 leads to a positive output gap the presence of a
stochastic   causes additional variation in this gap as was the case before. Notably,
mis-measured TFP exhibits significantly more time variation than in the cases of
varying   or varying ⇡ alone. This is the result of changes in ⇡ and   jointly a↵ecting
the slow-moving joint distribution  . Importantly, the correlation between capital
reallocation and output is much lower in this environment. This comes about because
mis-measured TFP reacts more strongly through changes in   than ⇡. On the other
hand, both exogenous shocks a↵ect the amount of reallocation. The e↵ect of varying
⇡ on reallocation, however, is predominantly an extensive margin e↵ect, as a changing
fraction of plants can reallocate capital. The e↵ect of   is on the intensive margin:
more capital is reallocated within a given fraction of adjustable plants. Together this
explains the observed decrease in the correlation between reallocation and output.
Overall, adjustment frictions reduce reallocation, generating a non-degenerate dis-
tribution of average (and marginal) products of capital across plants. The cost is a
reduction in output of about 11%, relative to the frictionless benchmark. In all of
the experiments, reallocation is pro-cyclical. For these cases, measured variations
in TFP are the consequence of reallocation rather than true variations in aggregate
productivity. Variations in ⇡ lead to counter-cyclical productivity dispersion across
firms.
The economy with variations in both ⇡ and  mimic the patterns of pro-cyclical re-
allocation and counter-cyclical dispersion emphasized by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006).
This will be a leading case as the analysis proceeds.
2.4.2 Endogenous Capital Accumulation
With endogenous capital accumulation, solving (2.14), the capital reallocation process
has significant interactions with the capital accumulation decision. The frictions exert
a level e↵ect on the optimal capital stock and induce di↵erent dynamics following an
exogenous shock. As we saw above, reallocation behaves cyclically in the presence of
time-series variation in ⇡ and/or  . Variations in   and ⇡ a↵ect the instantaneous
value of existing capital and, because of persistence, the expected future return to
capital, too. This a↵ects the planner’s incentives to invest. Even absent any frictions
to capital accumulation the dynamics of investment and consumption are considerably
altered by the presence of exogenous shocks to reallocation or the variance of the
idiosyncratic shock.
Adding endogenous capital accumulation does not alter the results on the re-
allocation process shown in Table 2.1. The reason parallels the argument for the
independence of reallocation from A. From (2.10), total output is proportional to
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AK↵. Thus just as variations in A scale moments, so will variations in K. Con-
sequently, the analysis focuses on the e↵ects of frictions in reallocation on capital
accumulation.
Table 2.2 summarizes results for the endogenous capital accumulation problem,
using the baseline parameters, defined earlier. The aggregate capital stock is now
endogenous and creates additional variation. The average capital stock (relative to
the frictionless benchmark) is shown in the K¯/K¯⇤ column. The other columns report
correlations of reallocation with investment and output, C(R, i) and C(R, y) and the
correlation of investment and the Solow residual, C(A˜, i).
Case K¯/K¯⇤ C(R, i) C(R, y) C(A˜, i)
Frictionless
nonstochastic 1
(0)
na
( )
na
( )
na
( )
stochastic A 1
(0)
na
( )
na
( )
na
( )
stochastic   1
(0)
0.94
(0.01)
0.90
(0.01)
0.99
(0.001)
Frictions
nonstochastic 0.75
(0)
na
( )
na
( )
na
( )
stochastic A 0.75
(0)
na
( )
na
( )
0.955
(0.09)
stochastic ⇡ 0.75
(0.005)
0.97
(0.01)
0.91
(0.003)
0.97
(0.005)
stochastic   0.75
(0.0006)
0.93
(0.01)
0.88
(0.01)
0.979
(0.001)
stochastic ⇡,  0.75
(0.003)
0.790
(0.01)
0.767
(0.02)
0.964
(0.01)
Table 2.2: Endogenous Capital Accumulation: Aggregate Moments
Results from 100 simulations with T=1000, N=10,000 are reported with standard deviations in paren-
theses below. Simulations with frictions were computed with a mean of ⇡ equal to 0.5, mean of   = 1,
a ⇢ of 0.6, N=10,000 plants. K¯/K¯⇤ reports the average capital stock relative to the frictionless bench-
mark. C(R, i) is the correlation between reallocation and investment, C(R, y) is the correlation between
reallocation and output, and C(A˜, i) is the correlation between mis-measured TFP and investment. The
“na” entry means that the correlation is not meaningful as one of the variables is constant.
From Table 2.2, the interaction of costly reallocation and accumulation is evident
in a number of forms. First, K¯, which is the average capital for a particular treatment,
depends on the nature and magnitude of the capital adjustment costs. Even in the
absence of any aggregate shocks, the capital stock is around 25% lower when there
are adjustment frictions compared to the frictionless case. This comparison of the
average capital stocks with and without frictions stands regardless of the source of
the shocks.
Second, the addition of the shocks increases the variability of capital. With shocks
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to both ⇡ and   the standard deviation of the capital stock is considerably higher
than when there are only exogenous productivity shocks.
Third, capital accumulation is positively correlated with both reallocation and
the Solow residual. An increase in  , for example, leads to an increase in investment,
reallocation and output. The correlation of reallocation and investment, C(R, i), is
informative about the e↵ects of frictions on the incentive to accumulate capital.21 An
increase in ⇡ say, will imply that more plants are able to adjust and for this reason
alone reallocation will increase. With ⇡ correlated, it is likely that more plants will
be able to adjust in the future, so investment increases too. The magnitude of this
correlation is smaller when only   is random. Though the same fraction of plants
adjusts each period, the gains to adjustment are larger when   is high. This generates
a positive correlation between reallocation and investment.
Finally, reallocation is pro-cyclical in the presence of shocks to either ⇡ or  . This
returns to one of the themes of the paper. If variations arise from either changes in
the fraction of adjusting plants, through ⇡, or by a change in the spread of the shocks,
through  , output responds. The key to this response is reallocation: the e↵ects on
output of getting the right amount of capital into its most productive use. This is
captured through A˜.
2.4.3 Impulse Response Functions
Figures 2-3 and 2-4 show impulse response functions for negative shocks to ⇡ and  .
The shocks occur in period t = 5. The x-axes show time, while the y-axes in panels
2-4 shows the % deviation from the unconditional mean. The drop in the exogenous
shock of interest is plotted in the first panel, while all other exogenous shocks are set
to their unconditional means.
We first discuss Figure 2-3. The second panel shows the evolution of the two
moments µn and  n. The negative correlation between the two series is very high,
as changes in ⇡ e↵ect the evolution of µn and  n in very similar ways. The third
panel illustrates the co-movement between reallocation ‘R’ and the Solow residual.
Following the shock to ⇡ less capital can be reallocated between plants, which directly
a↵ects A˜. The e↵ects on output and investment are negative, as the last panel shows.
Consumption, though, increases in response to the innovation to ⇡, as discussed
further below.
Figure 2-4 shows the e↵ects of a negative shock to  . The second panel shows
the evolution of the two moments µn and  n. The sharp drop in  n is a direct
21For the nonstochastic and stochastic A models, this correlation is not defined as capital reallo-
cation is constant.
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Figure 2-3: Variations in ⇡: Impulse Response Functions. The y-axes show % devia-
tions from unconditional means.
e↵ect of the shock to  , whereas the increase in µn reflects the e↵ects of di↵erent
reallocation choices. The panel highlights that   is a slow moving state variable,
implying that µn and  n do not adjust immediately to their new values following a
change in  . Furthermore, the variations in   have di↵erent e↵ects on  n (direct)
and µn (indirect), making the two moments imperfectly correlated. Variations in  
produce more cyclicality in  n than in µn.
Panel 3 shows the connection between mis-measured TFP and reallocation, which
leads to a cyclical e↵ect on output. In this economy with time-varying idiosyncratic
uncertainty in the presence of adjustment costs there is a strong cyclical dimension
of capital reallocation. Reallocation is driving time-variations in output.
Output and investment both fall in response to a negative shock to  . The in-
vestment response is quite strong: when   falls investment opportunities are reduced.
Output falls as well due to the reduced dispersion in productivity across plants. These
e↵ects are driven by the “love of variety” aspect of the production technology. The
large decrease in investment coupled with a smaller reduction in output implies that
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Figure 2-4: Negative shock to  : Impulse Response Functions. The y-axes show %
deviations from unconditional means.
consumption increase at the time of the shock. We return to this point later.
These responses do not include the fall in output associated with an increase in
the dispersion of shocks, as emphasized in Bloom (2009), Bloom et al. (2012) and
others. As noted above, this reflects a couple of features of our environment: (i) the
timing of the shock to  , (ii) the model of adjustment costs and (iii) the specification
of the production function. Nonetheless, as indicated above, the model with both
shocks, i.e. the stochastic (⇡, ) case, is able to match the two key observations of
pro-cyclical reallocation and a counter-cyclical dispersion in capital productivity.
2.4.4 Robustness
The previous results illustrated a couple of themes. First, variations in either ⇡ or
  are necessary to generate cyclical movements in reallocation, with resulting e↵ects
on mis-measured TFP. Second, evolution of the cross sectional distribution generated
dynamics only in the stochastic ⇡ and/or   cases. This is illustrated by the fact that
higher order moments are relevant in the planner’s optimization problem and the
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evolution of these moments are seen in the impulse response functions.
Parameter changes R/R⇤ Et( i(arpkit)) G  (A˜/A) C(R, A˜) C( i(arpkit), A˜)
Frictions
Baseline 0.492
(0.005)
1.09
(0.006)
0.108
(0.0008)
0.10
(0.003)
0.817
(0.012)
 0.194
(0.03)
↵ = 0.8 0.498
(0.008)
2.33
(0.02)
0.123
(0.0006)
0.25
(0.007)
0.52
(0.04)
0.475
(0.03)
⇡¯ = 0.3 0.283
(0.005)
1.23
(0.005)
0.207
(0.001)
0.145
(0.004)
0.945
(0.004)
 0.246
(0.04)
⇡¯ = 0.9 0.899
(0.005)
0.353
(0.01)
0.014
(0.0002)
0.088
(0.003)
0.54
(0.03)
 0.247
(0.05)
⇢⇡ = 0.5 0.492
(0.001)
1.09
(0.004)
0.107
(0.0003)
0.07
(0.001)
0.659
(0.01)
0.486
(0.025)
⇢" = 0.5 0.429
(0.008)
1.45
(0.01)
0.248
(0.002)
0.105
(0.004)
0.965
(0.002)
 0.487
(0.03)
   = 0.1 0.491
(0.006)
1.14
(0.02)
0.11
(0.002)
0.49
(0.001)
0.692
(0.01)
0.762
(0.02)
   = 0.1, ⇢  = 0.5 0.491
(0.006)
1.14
(0.01)
0.112
(0.0006)
0.341
(0.006)
0.554
(0.019)
0.609
(0.02)
timing 0.498
(0.007)
0.930
(0.01)
0.106
(0.002)
0.10
(0.006)
0.84
(0.02)
 0.78
(0.02)
Table 2.3: Capital Reallocation: Robustness
Model with stochastic ⇡ and  . Standard deviations in parentheses.
This section studies the robustness of these findings to alternative values of key
parameters. Table 2.3 reports our findings. It has the same structure as Table 2.1.
The first column indicates the model. The baseline is the case with adjustment costs
and stochastic (⇡, ) taken from Table 2.1.
In the second row we show the e↵ects of moving ↵ from 0.60 to 0.80. The increase
in the curvature of the revenue function leads to a larger output gap and a higher
degree of misallocation. This result is largely driven by the non-adjustable plants:
The column R/R⇤ shows that reallocation among adjustable plants is higher than in
the benchmark scenario.
The baseline model assumes ⇡¯ = 0.5. The third and fourth rows of Table 2.3
study the implications of lower and higher adjustment rates. Not surprisingly, the
reallocation rate is increasing in ⇡, as frictions are lower. This is consistent with Figure
2-2. The correlation of reallocation and mis-measured TFP is positive, though lower
than in the baseline at ⇡ = 0.90.
The standard deviation of actual to mismeasured TFP also varies with ⇡¯. When
⇡¯ is high, the response of the planner to a variation in   is to reallocate capital so
that  (A˜/A) is small compared to the case of low ⇡¯. This is reflected in the mean
standard deviation of the average revenue product of capital.
The table includes two rows in which the serial correlation of shocks is set to 0.5,
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lower than their baseline values of ⇢⇡ = 0.9 and ⇢" = 0.9. Relative to the baseline,
the reduction in the serial correlation of ⇡ leads to a reduction in the cyclicality of
reallocation. With adjustment opportunities less correlated, the costs of reallocat-
ing resources that are subsequently mismatched with productivity is higher. Hence
reallocation is less correlated with A˜. This will imply that the correlation of realloca-
tion and investment is lower than in the baseline reflecting the costs of accumulating
capital when future adjustment costs are less certain.
When ⇢" is decreased, the planner has fewer incentives to reallocate capital among
adjustable plants. Consequently, the amount of capital reallocation falls and the
ine ciency of the solution becomes more pronounced. This can be seen in the larger
standard deviation of the marginal products of capital and in a higher output gap.
The row labeled    = 0.1 increases the variability of   relative to the baseline
where    = 0.014. This spread is closer to that in Bloom (2009) and Gilchrist et al.
(2014). Not surprisingly, this extra volatility in the spread of idiosyncratic shocks
leads to much more volatility in A˜ relative to the baseline. Reallocation remains
pro-cyclical though less compared to the baseline.
The next row shows how a reduction in the serial correlation of   given the high
variance of   influences these moments. With a lower serial correlation of the shocks
to  , the correlation between reallocation and A˜, though still positive, is considerably
lower than the baseline. With less persistent shocks, reallocation is less responsive to
variations in   and ⇡.
The last row is a modification to the model that influences the extent of the
“love of variety e↵ect”. The row labeled “timing” assumes that the planner knows of
a change in the cross sectional distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks one period in
advance. That is, the future value of   is in the current state space. This is the timing
used in Bloom (2009) as a way to emphasize the uncertainty e↵ects of a change in
the distribution. In our environment, the change in timing has some modest e↵ects
relative to the baseline. There is less dispersion in the average product of capital
but this dispersion is more negatively correlated with A˜ compared to the baseline.
With the alternative timing assumption the planner reallocates more capital when
  is known to remain high, and less capital when   is known to remain low. This
increases the counter-cyclicality of the dispersion and leads to an allocation of capital
that is on average closer to the frictionless benchmark.
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2.5 Approximation
The previous section showed that the covariance   matters for determining the op-
timal capital allocation. The problem in (2.14) includes  , the joint distribution of
(k, "). Using the first two moments of this distribution, µn and  n, the evolution of
  can be tracked perfectly. This is important for the planner, who has to forecast
the expected future output from non-adjustable plants, y0n. Variations in ⇡ and  
generate movements in   and hence in yn. Capital reallocation is tightly linked to
changes in the mis-measurement of TFP when stochastic shocks are present.
Movements in   may not be captured well by the first moment µn alone. In the
frictionless case the two moments were perfectly correlated, but this perfect corre-
lation is broken by the existence of time-variation in the adjustment probability ⇡
and/or  . The impulse response functions above showed that both in the case of
shocks to ⇡ or   the two moments µ and   were strongly correlated. However, dif-
ferent shocks imply di↵erent magnitudes of change in µ,  , and output. A change in
  produces a stronger reaction in   and a smaller reaction in µ compared to a shock
in ⇡. Output changes of the same magnitude can therefore occur at the same time
as di↵erent changes in µ. This produces the reduced explanatory power of the first
moment µ. The significance of reallocation e↵ects is related to the forecasting power
of  n.
Relative to the literature starting with Krusell and Smith (1998), this is an im-
portant finding. In particular, this result is distinguished from preceding
papers in that for our environment the approximation of the cross sec-
tional distribution requires higher order moments.
This section makes two points. First, it emphasizes the importance of including
the higher order moments in the state vector. From this we can determine how
well the evolution of   could be captured by di↵erent subsets of its moments under
di↵erent cases of stochastic ⇡ and  .
Second, we compare the aggregate outcome of the model against a standard
stochastic growth model. This allows us to determine to what extent the reallocation
e↵ects influence cyclical properties of the model.
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2.5.1 Goodness of Fit
Table 2.4 evaluates the importance of the higher order moments.22 To understand this
table, let “DGP” refer to a data set (and moments) created by solving the baseline
model (with stochastic ⇡ and  ) using (µ, ) in solving the planner’s problem. In
(2.14), the planner forecasts y0n, the output from non-adjustable plants next period.
The correctly specified regression model including both moments is given by
yDGPn,t =  0 +  1µn,t +  2 n,t +  3st + "t, (2.29)
where st includes ⇡t and  t. Estimation results in  ˆ0 = 0,  ˆ1 = 1.6487 = "¯,  ˆ2 = 1,
and  ˆ3 = 0 with an R2 = 1. The maximum forecast error (MCFE) is zero. As
discussed in Den Haan (2010) a problem of R2 measures to assess the approximation
is that observations generated using the true law of motion are used as the explanatory
variable. We construct a series ˆˆyn which is using only the approximate law of motion.
The forecast error is defined as ˆˆ"t+1 = |ˆˆyn,t+1 yn,t+1|, and the MCFE is the maximum
of this series.
Below we study three cases (experiments). The first takes output of the non-
adjusting plants from the DGP and regresses it on an intercept, the exogenous state,
and the first moment only. Thus this exercise is about approximating the nonlinear
solution with a linear representation. The regression model for the linear approxima-
tion is given by (2.29) where we force  2 = 0. From Table 2.4, the linear representation
is very accurate if only ⇡ is stochastic. When   is random, the resulting movements
in the distribution of shocks leads to much greater significance of the cross sectional
distribution in forecasting (decisions do not change in this experiment).
The second case actually solves the planner’s problem under the (false) assumption
that the model is linear. The resulting decision rules and expectations are model
consistent by construction, but not data consistent.23 The goodness of fit measure is
computed from a regression of the output of the non-adjusting plants in the DGP using
the model consistent estimators from the linearized approximation. As before, the
linear beliefs in the stochastic ⇡ case are approximately consistent with the outcome.
Again this is not the case when   is random. For this experiment, the linear forecast
rule leads to very di↵erent allocative decisions by the planner. Consequently, the R2
is quite low – movements in the cross sectional distribution are very important.
22Only the stochastic model with frictions is explored. The case of “stochastic A” is not of interest
as the higher order moments did not matter. For these experiments, the shocks are held fixed to
isolate the e↵ects of the approximation.
23The R2 from the forecast of µ in the linearized version of the model typically exceeds 0.99. In
this sense, the solution is internally consistent.
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In the third case, the planner uses the DGP to obtain a linear approximation of the
law of motion. With this representation, the planner solves the optimization problem.
In this case, the expectations about the evolution of the state vector is consistent with
the data, but not with the model. Here, none of the experiments generate a good fit.
The planner is simply unable to capture the nonlinear movements in the economy
with a linear approximation of the law of motion.
Case R2 MFCE
Truth, approximated
Stochastic ⇡ 0.9907
( )
0.031%
( )
Stochastic   0.966
( )
1.37%
( )
Stochastic ⇡,  0.94
( )
2.5%
( )
Linear, consistent
Stochastic ⇡ 0.9908
( )
0.3954%
( )
Stochastic   0.6958
( )
0.7289%
( )
Stochastic ⇡,  0.7032
( )
1.707%
( )
Linear using DG truth
Stochastic ⇡ 0.94
( )
1.52%
( )
Stochastic   0.82
( )
1.339%
( )
Stochastic ⇡,  0.948
( )
1.78%
( )
Table 2.4: Di↵erent approximation strategies
The first column shows the R2 of a regression of output from non-adjustable plants on an intercept and
the first moment, µ only. The second column reports the maximum forecast error from such a regression.
2.5.2 Comparison to the RBC Model
This section compares the aggregate properties of our model with those of the RBC
model. There are two motivations for this exercise.
First, one of the key findings of Thomas (2002) and the literature that followed was
the near equivalence between the aggregate moments of a model with lumpy in-
vestment and the aggregate implications of a real business cycle model with quadratic
adjustment costs at the plant-level. This sub-section returns to that theme. Given
that higher order moments matter in the planner’s optimization problem, it is natural
to conjecture that the non-convexities also matter for aggregate moments.
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Second, a standard criticism of the RBC model is technological regress: i.e. ap-
parent reductions in total factor productivity. As emphasized in Bloom et al. (2012)
as well, model economies which induce variations in the Solow residual have the po-
tential to explain technological regress and can potentially match other correlation
patterns.
As we shall see, the aggregate moments of the model with stochastic (⇡, ) share
many of the characteristics of the RBC model. The Solow residual, driven by reallo-
cation, has a serial correlation of nearly 0.92. Consumption, investment and output
are positively correlated with the Solow residual and the model exhibits consump-
tion smoothing. In our environment, the puzzle of “What causes a reduction in the
Solow residual?” is easily resolved: measured productivity is low when reallocation
is low, either due to lower adjustment rates or a contraction in the distribution of
profitability shocks.
Our environment is di↵erent from Bloom et al. (2012) in a couple of important
ways. First, our model includes shocks to both the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks
and to adjustment costs. Second, as emphasized earlier, a mean preserving spread
increases investment. This reflects the timing in our model as well as the structure
of adjustment costs. In contrast to models with irreversibility and other forms of
non-convexities, there is no option-to-wait in our model with Calvo style adjustment
costs. Third, there are no adjustment costs to labor. Finally, as already emphasized,
higher order moments matter for the planner and generate an underlying dynamic. In
contrast, Bloom et al. (2012) exclude higher order moments in their approximation.
As indicated earlier, there is a dynamic to these higher order moments that underlies
the serial correlation in the Solow residual.
Case C(y, c) C(y, i) C(y, A˜) C(i, c) ⇢c ⇢i
 c
 i
 c
 y
Frictions
stochastic A 0.91
(0.01)
0.94
(0.01)
0.93
(0.01)
0.71
(0.02)
0.95
(0.02)
0.88
(0.02)
0.53
(0.03)
0.80
(0.03)
stochastic ⇡ 0.77
(0.04)
0.90
(0.01)
0.90
(0.002)
0.42
(0.04)
0.95
(0.01)
0.91
(0.01)
0.46
(0.06)
0.80
(0.05)
stochastic   0.72
(0.04)
0.93
(0.01)
0.89
(0.01)
0.42
(0.03)
0.97
(0.01)
0.82
(0.01)
0.34
(0.04)
0.66
(0.05)
stochastic ⇡,  0.782
(0.02)
0.898
(0.008)
0.915
(0.003)
0.427
(0.02)
0.96
(0.003)
0.86
(0.006)
0.46
(0.03)
0.80
(0.03)
RBC 0.981
(0.002)
0.913
(0.01)
0.986
(0.002)
0.818
(0.01)
0.954
(0.01)
0.890
(0.013)
0.633
(0.04)
0.919
(0.02)
Table 2.5: Endogenous Capital Accumulation - Macroeconomic Moments
Results from 1000 simulations are reported with standard deviations in parentheses below. Here C(x, y)
are correlations, ⇢x is an autocorrelation and  x is a standard deviation. The variables are: output (y),
consumption (c), investment (i) and the Solow residual (mis-measured TFP) (A˜).
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Table 2.5 presents standard aggregate moments for a number of cases. These are
the traditional macroeconomic moments: the correlations of output (y), consumption
(c), investment (i) and TFP(A˜). Here the TFP measure is the one constructed from
the data as if plants were homogeneous, i.e. mis-measured TFP. The serial correla-
tions of consumption and output as well as relative standard deviations are reported,
too.
The rows are the various cases explored before, using the baseline parameters. The
last row, “RBC” is the standard stochastic growth model with productivity shocks
and without adjustment costs.24 Here the productivity shocks come from fitting an
AR(1) process to the mis-measured TFP series, A˜, generated by the stochastic (⇡, )
case. We obtain an AR(1) parameter ⇢A˜ = 0.9183 and standard deviation of the
residual  A˜ = 0.0132. This process is fed into the model without adjustment frictions
to produce the “RBC” moments.
All of the models match the standard business cycle properties of positively corre-
lated movements of consumption and investment with output. All of these variables
are positively correlated with (mis-measured) TFP. So, in the case of shocks to  , the
Solow residual, investment and output all increase when there is a mean preserving
spread in the distribution of shocks. The models exhibit consumption smoothing.
The aggregate moments are all positively serially correlated.
Further, the models with stochastic ⇡ and/or   create considerably lower comove-
ment between consumption and investment compared to the RBC case. As in models
with intermediation shocks, such as ?, and discussed further for the case of stochastic
  in Bachmann and Bayer (2013), when returns to investment are large, say due to a
high value of  , consumption is reduced to finance capital accumulation.
The key to this lower correlation is the immediate inverse relationship between
consumption and investment when there is a shock to  . After the impact, consump-
tion and investment move together in the transition dynamics. So, overall there is
a positive correlation but one that is reduced due to the negative comovement in
response to the innovation. This can be see in the impulse response functions for our
model, Figures 2-3 and 2-4.
This e↵ect appears in other models of shocks to the variance of productivity
shocks. Looking at the impulse response functions in Bloom et al. (2012), Figures
7 and 8, and Bachmann and Bayer (2013), Figure 3, this negative comovement at
impact is apparent. Further, though this negative comovement is not evident in
unconditional data moments, it does appear in impulse response functions. In Figure
24The RBC moments are produced using our model without adjustment frictions. The only
stochastic shocks occur to A.
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3 of Bachmann and Bayer (2013), the immediate response in the data to an increase
in idiosyncratic risk is for output and investment to increase and consumption to
fall.25 Output and investment fall subsequently.
2.6 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to understand the productivity gains from capital reallo-
cation in the presence of frictions. To study this we have looked at the optimization
problem of a planner facing frictions in capital accumulation and shocks to produc-
tivity, adjustment costs and the distribution of plant specific shocks.
The heterogeneity in plant-level productivity provides the basis for reallocation.
The frictions in adjustment prevent the full realization of these gains. The model can
generate cyclical movements in reallocation and in the cross sectional distribution of
the average productivity of capital.
There are three key findings in this paper. The first is the cyclical behavior
of reallocation and the distribution of capital productivity. When shocks to either
adjustment frictions or the distribution of plant-level shocks are present, then re-
allocation is pro-cyclical. In fact, even if there are no direct shocks to TFP, the
reallocation process creates fluctuations in output and investment. These e↵ects are
not present when the only shock is to TFP. Further the standard deviation of the
cross sectional distribution of average capital productivity is counter-cyclical, as in
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) and Kehrig (2011).
Second, in some, though not all environments, the plant-level covariance of capital
and profitability shocks matters for characterizing the planner’s solution. This is
important for a few reasons. It is indicative of state dependent gains to reallocation
and our economy is an example of one where moments other than means are needed
in the planner’s problem.
Third, the model with shocks to adjustment costs and the cross sectional distri-
bution of productivity shocks can reproduce many features of the aggregate economy.
A researcher would interpret the data as generated by a model with TFP shocks even
though it is actually constant. That is, the researcher could certainly misinterpret
the variations in the Solow residual driven by the reallocation of capital as variations
in TFP.
25These results are for German data. Bloom et al. (2012) do not report impulse response functions
to uncertainty shocks in US data.
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Chapter 3
The Employment and Productivity
E↵ects of Short-Time Work in
Germany
3.1 Motivation
The question whether ’short-time work’ (STW) can save jobs during a recession has
found renewed interest following the recent global economic downturn. STW describes
a policy response whose alleged e↵ect is to reduce the negative impact of demand
shocks on the labor market. More specifically, the policy generates incentives for
firms to reduce employment through a reduction in the number of hours worked per
employee, instead of through adjustments in the number of employees. A number
of OECD countries have implemented short-time work schemes in order to prevent
massive layo↵s during times of economic distress. In the present study we will focus
on the largest such scheme, the German ’Kurzarbeit’. While the economic press has
often attributed the stability of the German labor market during the global economic
recession to the extensive use of Kurzarbeit in German firms (see Brenke et al. (2011),
Rinne and Zimmermann (2011), and references therein), a number of recent studies
takes a more critical stand (see e.g. Burda and Hunt (2011), Balleer et al. (2013),
Mo¨ller (2012)).
Figure 3-1 uses macroeconomic indicators to illustrate that the global economic
recession only had a minor impact on the German labor market. Similar to other
OECD countries, Germany was hit by the financial and sovereign debt crisis. In
response, output in Germany dropped sharply, resulting in a drop in GDP of 5.13
per cent in 2009. This was mainly caused by weak domestic demand and a reduction
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in exports to the US and the rest of the Euro Zone. At the same time hours worked
declined by 3.21 per cent in 2009.1 Even though German GDP growth was the second
lowest in the OECD, the labor market in Germany seemed almost una↵ected by this
shock: the unemployment rate continued to fall over the crisis period. This experience
stands in sharp contrast to the United States - where the economic recovery in the
post-crisis period has been described as ‘jobless’ - and other OECD countries.
Figure 3-1: Macroeconomic indicators for Germany between 2000 and 2011. Source:
data provided by OECD statistics (accessed March 2013).
Existing studies have in common that they focus on the question whether or not
Kurzarbeit can save jobs. An arguably equally important question regards the longer-
term implications of this policy for productivity, output, and employment. Besides
the additional financial burden faced by the social security system, the costs of STW
also include the e↵ects on output and employment which stem from the government’s
intervention into the allocation of factors. In market economies the e ciency of the
allocation of factors across production sites has been shown to play an important role
for aggregate productivity (see Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Bartelsman et al. (2013),
Cooper and Schott (2014)). While STW may decrease the level of unemployment
1The figure also suggests that adjustments in the year 2008 when the crisis first hit Germany
were mainly done through other instruments such as flexible time accounts.
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in the short run and mitigate the consequences of economic downturns, the negative
long-term e↵ects on productivity and employment could potentially outweight the
short-term gains. By preventing the reallocation of factors across production sites,
the policy may unintentionally induce a potentially long-lasting misallocation of la-
bor across firms. Because labor is partly prevented from flowing towards the most
productive firms, STW can generate adverse long term e↵ects on GDP through this
‘reallocation channel’.
In this paper we devise a dynamic, structural model of labor demand. The model
is calibrated to the German economy, which allows us to evaluate the costs and bene-
fits of Kurzarbeit quantitatively. Representative firm models ignore the large amount
of heterogeneity which is present between firms. Such a framework is therefore unable
to capture the e↵ects of a policy on labor reallocation between firms. Our micro data
collected at the firm level allows for a clear identification of the policy impact on firm
behavior. We exploit the panel structure of the data (AFiD-Panel Industriebetriebe,
Germany) and make use of information on medium and large firms in the manu-
facturing sector to better understand the short-term and long-term consequences of
labor market interventions during the recent recession. Although the AFiD-Panel
does not contain information on whether or not a firm applied for short-time work,
the following section produces ample evidence that the e↵ect of the policy is evident
in our data.
3.2 Kurzarbeit in Germany
Kurzarbeit has a long tradition in Germany.2 Firms’ eligibility is typically restricted to
specific economic conditions and imposes strict rules regarding the workforce a↵ected
by a reduction in working time.3 During the recent global recession the German
government dramatically loosened the Kurzarbeit eligibility criteria for firms and
significantly expanded the scope of the policy (Burda and Hunt (2011)). Figure 3-2
illustrates the increase of short-time work among German firms between 1990 and
2010.4 At its height in mid-2009 the Kurzarbeit program included around 60,000
establishments and approximately 1.5 million workers. The figure also shows that
2cite missing
3The German Social Security Code (SGB) III defines the legal framework for the use of
Kurzarbeit. Altogether, there are three di↵erent forms of short-time work: (1) Due to economic
distress (§170), (2) seasonal fluctuations (§175) and (3) transfer payments mainly during the Ger-
man reunification (§216b).
4The spike in STW to the beginning of the 1990s can mainly be attributed to labor market
adjustments during the transition of Eastern Germany from a planned economy to a market based
economy; see case (3) in previous footnote.
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absent recessions, the role of STW is negligible.5 For this reason we choose to focus
exclusively on the policy changes that were implemented during 2009 and 2010.
Figure 3-2: The use of short time work in Germany. Source: Bundesanstalt fuer
Arbeit, Germany (accessed March 2013).
The structure of the German economy plays an important role in evaluating the
impact of the global recession on the labor market. The use of STW was not evenly
distributed across industries and regions. It was mainly firms in the manufacturing
sector with strong dependence on exports which applied for STW in response to
economic distress. More specifically, many of these firms were part of the automobile
industry and included suppliers. These firms are heavily concentrated in some regions
in southern and western Germany. It is important to keep in mind that a sequence of
labor market reforms during the early 2000s, the so-called Hartz reforms o↵ered firms
more flexibility in adjusting the workforce. Even though these reforms undoubtedly
changed the underlying structure of the German labor market, transition dynamics
were mainly concluded by the time the global recession a↵ected Germany.6
We now describe the details of the short-time work policy which was put into
place in 2009 and 2010. The policy change consisted of an amendment to an ex-
5Seasonal fluctuations are heavily driven by the use of STW in the construction and agricultural
sector to mitigate the impact of periods of bad weather; see case (2) in previous footnote.
6see Krause and Uhlig (2012) who evaluate the impact of those reforms on employment.
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isting law which governs the use of short-time work by firms.7 Kurzarbeit during
the recession consisted of a state-subsidy of 60% (67% for workers with children) for
the net earnings di↵erence due to a working hours reduction. Hours worked were
paid as usual. The employers’ contribution to social security was initially paid in
full by the firm. In a subsequent modification, the employers’ contribution was made
proportional to the hours worked (Crimmann et al. (2010), Rinne and Zimmermann
(2011)). Kurzarbeit therefore provided incentives for firms wanting to cut back their
labor demand to reduce the number of hours worked per employee (intensive margin)
instead of reducing the number of employees (extensive margin). According to Burda
and Hunt (2011) Kurzarbeit constituted the most common source of changes in hours
per worker between 2008 and 2009.
Figure 3-3: Labor adjustments on the intensive and the extensive margin. Source:
author’s calculations from the micro data from the AFiD-Panel Industriebetriebe,
Germany.
Figure 3-3 uses our German micro-data to show the impact of the recession on rev-
enues and labor adjustments. The red squares indicate year-to-year revenue growth.
The blue bars show the year-to-year growth in the number of employees (dark blue)
and the average number of hours worked (light blue). All numbers represent yearly
averages of firm-level variables. Three things stand out. First and most importantly,
the years 2009 (2010) saw an unprecedented decline (increase) in the average hours
7See (German Social Security Code (SGB) III, §169 ↵) Further, we refer to Mo¨ller (2012) and
Burda and Hunt (2011) for additional details.
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worked, while the 2009 adjustment in the total number of employees appears small
in proportion to the fall in revenues. Second, given the overall pattern, changes in
revenues are more pronounced than changes in employment or average hours worked.
Third, changes in employment appear to react to changes in revenues with a lag,
while changes in average hours respond contemporaneously.
The fact that Kurzarbeit created an unprecedented flexibility in average hours is
central to this study. We therefore present further evidence in Figure 3-4, where we
show the distribution of changes in average hours for the years 2000-2008 (dark blue)
vs. the recession years 2009 and 2010 (respectively blue and light blue).8 The data
is computed using year-to-year changes on the establishment-level. For example, the
bin ‘-20%’ shows the percentage of firms that changed the average number of hours
worked by their employees by between -10 and -20%, while the bin ‘-30%’ shows the
percentage of firms that adjusted average hours worked by more than -30%. Three
things stand out: First, in general the hours change distribution is characterized
by many small adjustments of less than 2.5%, but virtually no inaction. Second,
there exists a significant number of firms each year in which average hours worked
are adjusted by more than 20% in absolute value, implying that large changes in
average hours are prevalent. The third observation regards the changes in 2009-10
with respect to the previous years. We see a clear shifting of firms towards the
tails of the distribution, where the large negative (positive) adjustments stem from
2009 (2010). In fact, the distribution in 2010 is almost a mirror image of 2009,
as adjustments in average hours are reverted after the end of the STW policy. The
fraction of firms that reduced average hours by over 20% more than tripled starting in
2009. In 2010, on the other hand we observe larger-than-average positive adjustments
in average hours worked. We conclude that data we are using to compute the moments
the model is ultimately trying to match thus clearly shows the impacts of the STW
policy. The reduction in average hours can be taken to stem from the STW policy,
while as the policy faded out in 2010, hours adjustments were reversed.
3.2.1 Relation to Existing Studies
In this paper we estimate a structural model of the employment behavior of hetero-
geneous firms. In contrast to much of the existing literature on STW we tackle the
question of the e↵ectiveness of STW from a labor demand perspective. Because the
decision about STW lies with the firm we find this the right perspective to take.
In our model, firms di↵er in their idiosyncratic productivity and consequently have
8Excluding the recession years 2000 and 2001 leaves the results virtually unchanged. In the
Appendix we show the distribution by year. There is very little variation between 2000 and 2008.
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Figure 3-4: Distribution of average hours changes. Source: author’s calculations from
the micro data from the AFiD-Panel Industriebetriebe, Germany.
di↵ering labor demand. Firms simultaneously choose the number of employees and
the number of hours worked per employee. We then calibrate the model to match
key moments of the German microdata. The calibrated model is used to understand
and evaluate the e↵ects of the policy reform introduced by the German government
in 2009.
We share the skepticism of other authors (add refs) about whether Kurzarbeit was
e↵ectively able to save jobs. This skepticism is founded on the results of a structural
model which we use to evaluate the Kurzarbeit policy. Using a structural model is
preferable for at least three reasons. First, we derive the macroeconomic implications
of STW directly from the microeconomic data. This is important because there exist
important non-linearities in the labor adjustment decisions of heterogeneous plants
which can have macroeconomic implications. For example, firms that increase their
labor demand at the end of a recession might not be the same firms that decreased
their labor demand at the recession’s onset. Our approach puts the firm-level decision
rules for hours and employment at the heart of the analysis, allowing us to study the
e↵ect of STW on firms with di↵erent characteristics such as size or profitability. Sec-
ond, the calibrated economy enables to us evaluate counter-factual scenarios. We can
ask what the e↵ect on the German economy would have in the absence of Kurzarbeit.
Third, one of the most fundamental questions about the e↵ectiveness of STW cannot
be answered adequately in a reduced-form setting. Given recent findings about the
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macroeconomic importance of the allocation of factors (Hsieh and Klenow (2009),
Bartelsman et al. (2013)), one of the main concerns about STW is that it consti-
tutes a goverment intervention into the allocation mechanism. In order for such an
intervention to be welfare-enhancing one would have to identify a market failure this
policy can help to overcome. As we show further below, we do not find convincing
evidence for this. Going beyond this, we are able to quantify the short- and long-run
e↵ects on output and employment which stem from this ‘reallocation channel’.
Recent papers which study STW in Germany include Burda and Hunt (2011),
Balleer et al. (2013), Krause and Uhlig (2012), and Cahuc and Carcillo (2011). Burda
and Hunt (2011) provide an excellent overview of the institutional framework in Ger-
many and describe the 2009/10 policy in great detail. Using a reduced form model
Balleer et al. (2013) do not find a significant employment e↵ect of STW, but they
do find a positive, albeit small e↵ect, on output. They devise a search and matching
model which can rationalize those e↵ects. In their model heterogeneous workers can
be put on STW. If an STW ‘policy shock’ is persistent, it generates positive output
and employment e↵ects because the firm can reduce the working times of unprof-
itable workers and the value of a match is increased. Krause and Uhlig (2012) also
use a search-and-matching model with heterogeneous workers and skill depreciation
to analyze the German Hartz-reforms, a major overhaul of the unemployment benefits
system e↵ectuated during the early 2000s. Regarding STW they conclude that the
transition towards a post-reform steady state was mainly achieved prior to 2008 and
that STW played an important role in keeping umemployment low. Our model dif-
fers significantly from Balleer et al. (2013) and Krause and Uhlig (2012). It features
heterogeneous firms and homogeneous workers. Firms are subject to idiosyncratic
productivity shocks which evolve persistently over time. In Balleer et al. (2013) STW
is the only possibility for firms to adjust hours per worker. In this sense, STW is
simply a reduction in the marginal cost of adjusting labor demand along the intensive
margin to a value less than1. This unrealistic description of labor adjustment costs
also makes the resulting positive e↵ects of STW little surprising. Krause and Uhlig
(2012) do not model STW directly. In contrast to this, we use a simulated method
of moments (SMM) technique to estimate adjustment costs that are able to replicate
the distributions of hours and employment changes in German firms.
Other related papers include Burdett and Wright (1989) an Braun et al (2013).
Burdett and Wright (1989) study how unemployment insurance and STW distort
labor inputs. Their main results are than UI causes ine cient layo↵s, while STW
induces ine cient hours. Braun et al (2013) build on this framework to study the
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welfare e↵ects of short-time work. They find that the e↵ectiveness of STW depends
on the degree to which firms are insured against idiosyncratic profitability shocks.
Similarly to us they find that STW can be poorly targeted and benefit the ‘wrong’
firms.
3.3 Data
The German ‘AFiD-Panel Industriebetriebe’ collects annual data ranging from 1995
to 2010 on the universe of German manufacturing plants with more than 20 employ-
ees.9 The underlying data is collected on a monthly basis and the aggregated by year.
The data covers approximately 50,000 plants per year. In the case of Germany where
employment in the manufacturing sector is heavily concentrated in medium sized and
family owned firms (German Mittelstand), the focus on the impact of labor market
policies on firm behavior during the global economic recession requires the inclusion
of medium-sized manufacturing firms.10 Using o cial micro data prepared and made
available trough the German Federal Statistical O ce in cooperation with the statis-
tical o ces of the German Laender we can drastically reduce the bias due to sampling
problems because of of over- and under-sampling firms with certain characteristics.
Descriptive statistics on the most important variables can be summarized as fol-
lows. This paper makes use of a balanced panel which includes a sub sample of 19,522
firms observed for every year between 1995 and 2010. To abstract from extreme ob-
servations this sub sample of firms also excludes observations which report revenues,
hours or employment levels above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile of
the initial distribution. On average (over all years and all firms) each firm in the final
sample employs 184 workers. Average hours worked per employee are 135.47 hours
per month (including overtime). Mean revenues reported per firm are 3.65 million
Euros (deflated to 2005). The mean wage bill is reported to be 0.40 million Euro
(deflated to 2005). These numbers suggest that workers compensation accounts for
on average 10.1 per cent of revenues.
9The AFiD-Panel, Industriebetriebe includes smaller plants if they belong to a firm with at least
20 employees. For the years 2007 to 2010 the cuto↵ to be included into the production survey is 50
employees.
10Alternative data provided by commercial providers such as Amadeus often only collects annual
information on publicly listed companies with a focus on financial variables.
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3.4 Model
The economy consists of firms, workers, and a government. Firms choose their opti-
mal level of employment and hours each period and produce a homogenous output
good. Similar to Rogerson (1989) workers are part of a large, risk-sharing house-
hold which owns the firms. Employed workers receive a wage income to compensate
them for the total number of hours worked. This remuneration can include overtime
compensation or short-time work subsidies. If workers are unemployed they receive
unemployment benefits b. Unemployment benefits and short-time subsidies are paid
by the government which finances itself through taxation.11 A period in the model
refers to one month.
The institutional arrangement on the German labor market is characterized by
collective wage agreements. Those agreements are binding for trade union members
and employers who are part of the employer’s association which led the negotiations
with the trade union. The standard workweek (h¯) as well as the hourly base wage
(!0) are subject to these negotiations. We do not explicitly model the contract which
determines h¯. We assume that firms are small enough such that they take the level
of h¯ as given (see Hunt 1999). Positive and negative deviations from h¯ are costly for
the firm: Positive deviations require the payment of an overtime premium of typically
around 25%. While small weekly fluctuations in hours worked can be compensated
through working time accounts (Burda and Hunt (2011)), reductions of average hours
worked to a level below h¯ are typically only possible through traditional short-time
work (absent the modifications introduced during the recent recession). We therefore
assume that absent the policy choices of h < h¯ are not feasible (see Kydland &
Prescott (1991) or Hunt (1999)). The social security contributions are a function of
h, the actual number of hours worked.
3.4.1 Firms
We now present the dynamic problem of the firm.12 The timing of events for a
firm in period t is as follows. In the beginning of the period all plants observe the
current profitability draw A.13 Profitability can entail a common shock as well as a
plant-specific shock. Given A and the firm’s beginning-of-period level of employment
e 1 the firm chooses the level of employment e and average hours worked h   h¯ to
11Social security contributions in Germany are paid in part by the firms and in part by the workers.
12The dynamic optimization problem builds from the specification in Cooper et al. (2007) and
Cooper et al. (2011).
13Time subscripts are dropped for notational convenience.
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maximize its value V (A, e 1. If e 6= e 1) the firm pays adjustment costs to adjust its
stock of workers. Adjustments in hours occur without adjustment costs.
The value of the firm in state (A, e 1) is given by
V (A, e 1) = max
h,e
R(A, e, h)  !(e, h)  C (e 1, e) +  EA0|AV (A0, e) (3.1)
for all (A, e 1). Here R(A, e, h) is the revenue flow of a plant with e workers, each
working h hours in profitability state A. !(e, h) refers to the compensation of workers
and C (e 1, e) describes the adjustment costs to labor. The revenue function depends
on hours per worker (h) and the number of workers (e).14 Factors of production other
than labor, such as capital and energy, are freely adjustable within a period. With
constant returns to scale and constant elastic demand, the revenue function takes the
form R(A, e, h) = A(eh)↵. The coe cient ↵ reflects the curvature of the production
function along with the elasticity of demand. Note that this particular production
function implies that the elasticities of R with respect to e and h are identical. We
discuss the implications of this assumption further below (see also Burdett and Wright
(1989)). Current profits are defined as revenues minus compensation paid to workers
and minus costs of adjusting the workforce.
Compensation without STW
A key part of our analysis concerns the compensation function !(e, h). Due to trans-
fers from the government the compensation paid by firms and the compensation
received by workers di↵er. Prior to the introduction of STW the compensation paid
by the firm to workers is given by:
!(e, h) = e!0[h¯+  (h  h¯)](1 +  ). (3.2)
Here !0 plays the role of a base wage. The social security contribution is parame-
terized by  .   determines the overtime premium if actual hours worked h exceed
the standard workweek h¯. Absent the short-time work policy the average number of
hours worked cannot lie below the standard work week, so h   h¯. The length of the
average work week h¯ is taken as given by the firm.
14This function comes from the product of a production function and the demand function facing
the plant.
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Compensation with STW
After the STW reform, the compensation function is more complicated. In addition
to overtime also h < h¯ is allowed. For 0  h  h¯, the compensation paid by the firm
is
!(e, h) = e!ˆ0[h(1 +  ) + µ(h¯  h) ] (3.3)
The firm pays social security contributions for h¯ but receives a subsidy of (1  µ)
from the government for the di↵erence in hours between h and h¯. The introduction
of µ was an essential part of the policy reform during the crisis. We parameterize the
social security contributions for the h¯ h hours paid by the firm by µ. An experiment
below will be how µ influences the hours and employment choices of the firm.
For h > h¯, i.e. when the firms chooses overtime after the reform, the only thing
which changes in the compensation function with respect to (3.2) is that the new base
wage is given by !ˆ0.
!(e, h) = e!ˆ0[h¯+  (h  h¯)](1 +  ). (3.4)
Labor Adjustment Costs
The cost of adjusting the stock of workers is given by C (e 1, e). This function cap-
tures the various inputs into the process of hiring a worker, including search, re-
cruitment and training costs. It may contain both convex and non-convex forms of
adjustment costs. A general cost of adjustment function would be
C (e 1, e) = F+ +  +(e  e 1) + ⌫
2
✓
e  e 1
e 1
◆2
e 1 (3.5)
if there is job creation e > e 1. Similarly
C (e 1, e) = F  +   (e 1   e) + ⌫
2
✓
e  e 1
e 1
◆2
e 1 (3.6)
if there is job destruction e < e 1. If e = e 1, i.e. when there are no net changes in
employment, then C (e 1, e) ⌘ 0.
There are three types of adjustment costs, with di↵erences allowed for the job cre-
ation and job destruction margins. The first is the traditional quadratic adjustment
cost, parameterized by ⌫. A fixed cost of adjustment is parameterized by F+ for job
creation and F  for job destruction. Finally, there are linear adjustment costs. The
linear firing cost    captures severance payments to workers. One of the key features
plant level data is inaction in employment adjustment. The fixed cost and linear costs
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are both capable of creating inaction.
A crucial question in our setup regards the substitutability between hours and
workers, the intensive and extensive margins of labor adjustment. Given the pre-
and post-policy compensation functions (3.2) and (3.3) above we can now study
the changes in firms’ incentives to reduce employment along either one of those two
margins before and after the policy.
Clearly, absent labor adjustment costs, with C(e, e 1) = 0, a firm would never
choose h > h¯ due to the overtime premium. After the introduction of the STW
policy all downwards adjustments of labor would go through reductions in e since
µ > 0. The calibration of the labor adjustment costs are therefore important in order
to generate movements in average hours.
3.4.2 Households
The household consists of a continuum of workers who can either be employed or
unemployed. We normalize the size of the continuum to one. Preferences of an
individual agent are given by u(c  g(h))  ⇣I(h > 0). Here c denotes consumption,
with u(·) being a strictly increasing and strictly concave function. The function
g(·) determines the disuility incurred from hours worked. We assume g(·) to be
strictly increasing and strictly convex. The last term in the individual agent’s utility
function describes a fixed cost of providing positive hours in the labor market. It is
parameterized by ⇣.
For this specification of compensation, the worker receives the amount given in
(3.2) without the social contribution: i.e. the worker receives !0[h¯ +  (h   h¯)]. As
we shall develop further, this compensation can be related to the worker’s utility
function.
(After the reform) From the worker’s perspective, for h  h  h¯, the worker
receives compensation directly from the firm of !ˆ0h and also obtains compensation of
 !ˆ0(h¯  h) from the government. Here   is a replacement rate for compensation lost
due to hours reductions. For h > h¯, the worker receives !(e,h)(1+ ) (for e = 0) from (3.4).
Note that the notation allows the base wage itself to change with the new pol-
icy towards hours variation. We will look at those changes both empirically (using
household data) and in theory, using a condition for labor market equilibrium.
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3.4.3 Government
Prior to the introduction of the policy the government collects tax revenues in order to
finance unemployment benefits b for the (1 N) unemployed workers. Taxes are raised
through the social security contributions of firms. We assume that the government’s
budget must be balanced at all times.
(1 N) · b =  
ˆ
e!0[h+  (h  h¯)]d⌃, (3.7)
where ⌃ is the joint distribution over firms’ profitability, hours, and employment.
After the policy the tax revenues also have to be used to finance the short-time work
scheme. The second term on the left-hand side is the integral over all firms who
use short-time work, i.e. where average hours have been reduced below h¯. For each
employee in such a firm the government pays a fraction of the loss in income,  (h¯ h)
plus a subsidy for the firms’ social security contributions. Instead of  h¯ the firms only
pay a fraction µ for every hour between h and h¯, the rest is paid by the government,
 (1  µ)(h¯  h).
(1 N)·b+
ˆ
h¯>h(e·(h¯ h)( + (1 µ)))d⌃ =  
ˆ
e!ˆ0[max(h, h¯)+ (h h¯)]d⌃ (3.8)
3.5 Parameterization and Estimation
The first set of parameters is not calibrated, but taken directly from the data. Those
include the overtime premium  , the social security contribution rate of the employer
 , the share of   paid by the firm in the case of STW µ, the replacement rate for the
foregone compensation due to hours reduction  , and the average workweek h¯. The
parameter values are summarized in Table 3.1. We provide additional information on
the parameter choices in the Appendix.
The base wage pre-policy will be set to match average employment size.
3.5.1 Revenue Function & Productivity Estimation
The revenue function, R(A, e, h) = A(eh)↵, is estimated first. We make use of plant-
level data to estimate the curvature of this function, ↵. The shock to the revenue
function is the residual from the estimation. From that residual we can obtain a
representation of the stochastic process for the revenue shock. This process is then
used in the solution of the dynamic optimization problem in equation (3.1).
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Table 3.1: Parameters for the German economy.
parameter characteristics value
  overtime premium 0.25
  employer social security contribution rate 0.21
µ share of social contribution paid by firm in case of STW 0.66
  replacement rate for compensation lost due to hours reduction 0.60 to 0.67
h contracted hours 38 hours
We estimate the production function using both OLS and the approach presented
in Wooldridge (2009), which instruments for labor using its first lag. In all specifica-
tions we control for time and industry dummies. In our micro data the total number
of hours worked in a firm is our independent variable of interest, as it corresponds to
e · h in our model. The estimated coe cients of ↵ are larger with the OLS approach,
but the estimated TFP levels do not di↵er much in magnitude. We find ↵ = 0.56.
The autocorrelation of idiosyncratic TFP is estimated to be 0.92.
3.5.2 Adjustment Costs Estimation
The remaining parameters are estimated via a simulated method of moments ap-
proach (SMM). This approach finds the vector of structural parameters, denoted ⇥,
to minimize the weighted di↵erence between simulated and actual data moments:
£(⇥) ⌘ (Md  M s(⇥))W (Md  M s(⇥))0. (3.9)
The parameters estimated by SMM are⇥ ⌘ (!0,!1, !ˆ0, !ˆ1, ⇣, h¯, ⌫, F+, F ,  +,   ,  ).
The estimation method starts by solving the dynamic programming problem in
(3.1) for a given value of ⇥. The decision rules are calculated as part of this solution.
Shocks to profitability are then drawn in a manner consistent with the process esti-
mated in the first stage. Given these shocks and the decision rules at the plant level,
a simulated panel data set is created and the simulated moments are calculated. The
weighting matrix, W, is obtained by inverting an estimate of the variance-covariance
matrix obtained from bootstrapping the data.
The key to the procedure is the choice of moments. These moments must be
statistically informative about the key parameters we wish to estimate. The adjust-
ment cost parameters can be identified from variations in job creation and destruction
rates as well as through the comovement of employment with revenues. The moments
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corresponding to the labor adjustment costs come from the employment change dis-
tribution shown in Figure 3-5
Figure 3-5: Distribution of employment changes. Weighted by total employment.
Source: own calculations from the micro data from the AFiD-Panel Industriebetriebe,
Germany.
3.6 Robustness
In this section we will check the results with respect to a number of assumptions, e.g.:
• Hours reduction not possible below h¯ prior to the policy
• How would results change if technology was biased against short-time work?
I.e. include fixed cost of employment for the firm.
• Whether or not employment takes time-to-build
• The (relative) revenue elasticities of hours and employment
3.7 Policy Simulations
Once we have estimated the structural parameters, ⇥ˆ, we can study the introduction
of the labor market policy. To a large degree this is just the substitution of (3.3) and
(3.4) for (3.2).
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3.8 Conclusion
This paper studies the employment and productivity implications of short-time work
in Germany. This policy was intended to provide incentives for firms during the recent
recession to adjust labor input through hours per worker (intensive margin) instead
of firing workers (extensive margin). Using confidential German firm micro data we
will estimate a model of costly labor adjustment and use it to simulate the e↵ects of
the policy.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.0 Data
The main dataset I use for this paper is the Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS)
dataset published by the Census. This annual dataset is derived from the Longitudinal
Business Database (LBD) and covers both firm size, firm age, as well as firm- and
establishment level data. A unique feature of the BDS is its longitudinal source data
that permit tracking establishments and firms over time. A strength of data is its
robustness to ownership changes because the age of a firm is determined by the age
of its oldest establishment.
I complement the analysis by considering alternative data sources obtained from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Virtually all of my qualitative results can also
be obtained with the ‘Business Employment Dynamics’ (BED)series by the BLS. The
BED is derived from a quarterly census of all establishments under state unemploy-
ment insurance programs, representing about 98 percent of employment on nonfarm
payrolls. The data frequency is quarterly. It includes data on firm age and firm size.
A caveat is the limited comparability between the age and size series as the age data
is based upon establishment-level data, while the size class tabulations use firm-level
data instead. For this reason I present most of the trends using the BDS data.
Another source released by the BLS is the Current Employment Statistics (CES)
program. This is a monthly survey of about 145,000 firms and government agencies,
representing roughly 557,000 establishments. Despite its high frequency the survey-
nature of the CES and its limited representation of the US economy make this data
source less useful for the purpose of the present paper.
The series for house prices come from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA),
which provides national and state-level house price indeces from 1991 onwards. The
unemployment rate was obtained from the BLS. The quarterly series of state-level
personal income was obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Variables used in Regression
N mean min p25 p50 p75 max
empc 3,276 -0.000 -4.4e+04 -1.2e+03 -88.366 975.876 8.1e+04
hpi 3,738 -0.000 -34.978 -2.381 -0.210 1.509 48.872
pi 3,738 0.000 -8.4e+04 -1.4e+03 -98.793 1144.323 8.0e+04
ue 3,738 0.011 -2.460 -0.408 -0.025 0.400 4.135
N 3738
Figure -6: Net job creation by start-ups vs. incumbents. Source: Census, BDS
A.1 Additional Material to support the Stylized Facts
This Appendix includes figures referenced to in the main text. It is intended to give
further evidence for the stylized facts presented in the main text.
The Importance of Start-Ups Figure -6 plots an updated version of a graph used
in Coles and Kelishomi (2011). It shows net job creation by start-ups and incumbent
firms. Net job creation by incumbent firms is typically negative. This is related to
the life cycle of a typical firm. Figure -7 shows gross job creation and destruction
between 1977-2011.
The left panel shows the raw data, while the right panel shows HP-filtered data. In
both cases we see that while job destruction spiked during the 2007-09 recession, the
spike was less pronounced than during the 2001 recession. Furthermore the graphs
show that compared to all previous recessions, there has been an unusually sharp
decline in job creation rates. Figure -8 compares the cyclicality of employment in
entrants and incumbents. The standard deviation of the plotted series are 0.10 for
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Figure -7: Gross job creation and destruction 1977-2011. The HP-filtered cyclical
component is depicted in the right panel. Source: Census, BDS
start-ups and 0.02 for incumbent firms.
Comparing di↵erent Recession episodes Other studies, e.g. Sanchez and Li-
borio (2012) have used alternative data sources such as the Business Employment
Dynamics (BED) from the BLS to show the decline in startup activity.
Indicators for Credit Supply, Interest Rates, and Home Equity Extraction
On the one hand, the lending environment has become tighter during the last reces-
sion. Many studies point to the idea that the decrease in credit supply is the result
of illiquid funding markets faced by commercial banks and a reassessment of bank
lending practices and business strategies (see literature review). Banks whose balance
sheets have been more severely a↵ected by increased loan defaults may either have
insu cient capital to make additional loans, or may choose to conserve capital instead
of making loans to entrepreneurs ?. Other than during previous post-WWII reces-
sions the percentage of institutions reporting negative quarterly net income increased
to over 30% in 2009.15 According to the Federal Reserve’s ‘Senior Loan O cer Opin-
15Based on FDIC data. The average number of institutions with negative quarterly income be-
tween 1990 and 2006 was 8.39%. During 2001 and 2002 the highest percentage was 14.87%. See also
Figure -12 where the increase in interest rates was much less pronounced during 2001 than 2008.
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Figure -8: Cyclicality of job creation. Start-ups vs. employment in incumbent firms
(dashed line). I HP-filter the annual data with   = 100. Plotted is the cyclical
component over the trend component. Recession dates are indicated as the shaded
areas. Source: Census, BDS
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Figure -9: Comparing Recession Episodes: GDP, Unemployment, number of start-ups
, and job destruction. GDP and unemployment are quarterly series, start-ups and job
destruction are annual. All series are HP-filtered with   = 100 for annual and   =
1600 for quarterly data. The x-axis shows periods since the respective pre-recession
peak, i.e. last period before the o cial NBER recession date. Unemployment data
comes from the BLS and matches the period of Census data publication. For the
annual series I treat the 1980 and 1981/2 recession as a single episode.
Figure -10: Cash Shiller Home Price Index. HP-filter   = 1600. The x-axis shows
quarters since the respective pre-recession quarter (based on NBER classification).
Inflation-adjusted, not seasonally adjusted. Source: Standard&Poor’s. Own compu-
tations
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Figure -11: Domestic Commercial and Industrial Loans to U.S. Addressees. The blue
solid line is C&I loans under $1Million (in Millions of $). The organe dotted line is
all C&I loans (in Millions of $). The yellow dash-dotted line is the number C&I loans
under $1Million. Source: FDIC
ion Survey on Bank Lending Practices’ by the end of 2008, 69.2% of banks reported
that they had tightened credit standards, especially for firms with annual sales less
than $50 million (80%). Results are shown in Figure -13.
Decomposing Changes in the Unemployment Rate Following the methodol-
ogy developed in Elsby et al. (2009) I use data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) and decompose changes in the unemployment rate into changes due to varia-
tions in the inflow rate and changes due to variations in the outflow rate of unemploy-
ment. The data shows that the increase in the unemployment rate was mainly due
to decreases in the outflow from unemployment, i.e. lower hiring. Using the formula
for the evolution of the steady state unemployment level we can write ut =
st
st+ft
,
where st and ft describe the unemployment inflow and outflow hazard rates. Log
di↵erentiation of this expression then yields d log ut ⇡ (1  ut)[d log st   d log ft]. See
Elsby et al. (2009) for further details. An increased entry hazard would speak for
higher rates of job destruction through layo↵s and quits, while a decreased exit prob-
ability is related to stalling job creation and/or decreased e ciency of the matching
process. While early papers such as Darby et al. (1986) suggested that increases in
unemployment during recessions are mainly due to increasing number of inflows, the
more recent literature has taken the opposite stand. Hall (2005a), Hall (2005b), and
Shimer (2012) have made the claim that modern recessions do not share this feature
and are characterized by acylcical inflow rates. I use the Q2 2013 Current Population
Survey (CPS) by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The left panel of Figure -15
100
Figure -12: Commercial and Industrial Loan Rates Spreads over intended federal
funds rate, by loan size and risk (E2). Source: Federal Reserve
Figure -13: Results from ‘Senior Loan O cer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Prac-
tices’. The blue line plots the net percentage of banks reporting tightening standards
for C&I loans to firms with annual sales of less than $50 million. The organge line
plots the net percentage of banks reporting stronger demand for C&I loans from those
same firms. Source: Federal Reserve.
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Figure -14: Used and Unused Home Equity Lines. Source: FDIC
Figure -15: Left: Log inflow hazard rate s (orange, left scale) and log outflow hazard
rate f (blue, right scale). Right: Changes in log inflow rates s and log outflow rates
f by recession. Changes are shown with respect to start-of-recession values. I follow
Elsby et al. (2009) in choosing the starting dates as the respective minimum and
maximum unemployment rates preceding and following the NBER recession dates.
Source: BLS, CPS, own computations.
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1-19 20-99 100-499 500+
Firms 88.4% 9.66% 1.54% 0.35%
Establishments 71.32% 10.48% 4.66% 13.54%
Employment 20.14% 18.02% 13.93% 47.90%
Number of Start-ups 98.1% 1.75% 0.14% 0.01%
Startup Employment 69.36% 20.90% 8.26% 1.47%
Table 3: Size- and Employment Distributions. Source: Census/BDS. Employment is
calculated using the DHS-denominator.
Age 0 Age 1 Age 2 Age 3 Age 4 Age 5
Firms 11.09% 8.54% 7.22% 6.29% 5.55% 4.97%
Employment 3.16% 3.15% 2.87% 2.68% 2.53% 2.42%
Age 6-10 Age 11-15 Age 16-20 Age 21-25 Age 26+
Firms 18.67% 12.91% 9.42% 7.18% 8.16%
Employment 10.36% 8.89% 8.14% 7.94% 47.87%
Table 4: Firm- and Employment distributions by age. Source: Census, BDS.
plots the log variation in the inflow (s) and outflow rates (f). While the inflow rate
increased at the onset of the recent recession, its cyclicality is dwarfed by that of the
decrease in the outflow rate. The right panel of the same figure plots the changes in
the decomposition of the unemployment rate and leads to the same conclusion: the
decreases in the unemployment exit hazard has been the major contributing factor to
the continuingly high unemployment rate we observe today. This result strengthens
the conclusion summarized in Stylized Fact 1.
The Size-Age Distribution of Firms and Establishments
A.2 Model Properties
This Appendix includes proofs, derivations, and details about the properties and fit
of the model.
Policy Function for Employment The policy function for employment is shown
in Figure -16.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Part 1: An agent will always choose to collateralize the highest possible frac-
tion of the loan. Denote this fraction as µ. The entrepreneur chooses this fraction to
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Figure -16: Employment Policy Function for given values of a, ✓, and e 1.
minimize his interest payments R˜ = 1 · µ + Rˆ · (1   µ). The minimization problem
reads min0µ1 ce   ce · 1 · µ   ce · Rˆ · (1   µ) subject to the collateral constraint
µ · ce  qh and 0  µ  1. The collateral constraint says that the value of the secured
fraction of the loan, µ · ce, cannot exceed the value of the collateral. The resulting
corner solution is µ = min{ qhce , 1}. If q
h
ce
  1 then µ = 1 and R˜ = 1. If qhce < 1 we have
µ = q
h
ce
and R˜ = q
h
ce
+ Rˆ(1  qhce ) = q
h
ce
+ Rˆ( ce q
h
ce
).
Part 2: In a given period the bank lends an uncollateralized amount x to a mass
Mt of ex-ante identical entering entrepreneurs. A fraction F ("¯x) =
´ "¯x
0 d⌫ of the
Mt entrants will receive an initial productivity draw below the exit threshold "¯x and
hence default on the loan. The remaining fraction 1   F ("¯x) = ´1"¯x d⌫ will receive a
draw above "¯x and repay the initial loan times the non-default interest rate Rˆ. The
zero-profit condition of the bank implies Mtx  Rˆ ·Mtx
´1
"¯x d⌫ = 0 or Rˆ =
 ´1
"¯x d⌫
  1
.
Clearly,
@
´1
"¯x d⌫
@"¯x < 0, so it follows that
@Rˆ
@"¯x > 0.
Proof of Corollary
Proof. We have 8<: @R˜@qh = 1ce   1ce · Rˆ  0 if qh < ce@R˜
@qh = 0 if q
h   ce
.
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Figure -17: Cyclical component of the unemployment rate. Data vs. simulation using
estimated processes only for qh between 1990 and 2011. Shaded areas correspond to
NBER recession dates.
Furthermore 8<:@R˜@Rˆ = 0 if qh   ce or "¯x = 0@R˜
@Rˆ
=  
⇣
ce qh
ce
⌘
< 0 else
.
From Proposition 1.4.2 @"¯
x
@a < 0 and
@"¯x
@✓ > 0. Since
Rˆ
"¯x > 0 we obtain the results
stated in the corollary.
A.2.1 Additional Model Simulations
A.2.2 Accuracy of the Solution
Figure ?? shows an accuracy plot which compares the actual values of ✓ from a
simulation of the model with the model forecast based on H. Importantly, the latter
series does not include the actual ✓ as an input, but makes forecasts based on the last-
period prediction. This means that errors are allowed to accumulate over time. Figure
?? shows that the two lines are almost indistinguishable. The average percentage
di↵erence is 0.002%. The maximum percentage di↵erence is 0.005%. This suggests
that H is succesful in tracking the simulated dynamics of ✓.
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Figure -18: Cyclical component of the unemployment rate. Data vs. simulation using
estimated processes only for a between 1990 and 2011. Shaded areas correspond to
NBER recession dates.
A.3 Computational Strategy
For the solution of the model I use a non-stochastic grid method. While this method
requires finer grids for firm-specific labor and productivity it has the great advantage
of eliminating sampling error. As ? shows, sampling error can lead to severe distor-
tions in the model’s results. This is all the more important in my setup, as the mass
of entering firms can be small relative to the mass of incumbents. Therefore sampling
uncertainty may bias the results even though the overall number of firms is large.
Before beginning the simulation I create fine grids for n and ✏. Denote the number
of grid points by #n and #✏, respectively. I specify an initial distribution over the
points [ni, ✏j], where i 2 [1, 2, . . . ,#n] and j 2 [1, 2, . . . ,#✏]. This determines the
mass of firms with employment ni and productivity ✏j. The simulation then follows
this iterative process:
1. At each grid point incumbent firms decide whether to continue operation or
exit. The decision is based on equation (1.9) above.
2. New firms enter based on equation (1.11)
3. The aggregate productivity state realizes according to its law of motion specified
in (1.13).
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4. The idiosyncratic productivity state realizes. This implies distributing the mass
at each point [ni, ✏j] to a new point [ni, ✏k], where k 2 [1, 2, . . . ,#✏], according
to the law of motion specified in (1.14).
5. Apply the employment policy function. This involves distributing the mass at
each point [ni, ✏k] to [n0i, ✏k], where n
0
i is given by the firm’s policy rule resulting
from the maximization of (1.4).
6. Go back to step 1.
The simulation algorithm takes as given the policy functions for employment (hires,
fires, and inaction)  e, and exit, as well as the laws of motion of all exogenous states,
⇡✏ and ⇡A. To find a solution for a given aggregate state A, it iterates on a distribution
over emplyment and idiosyncratic productivity,  (e, ✏) and finds its fixed point, where
 t+1(e¯l, ✏¯m) =
MX
i=1
NX
j=1
Pr( e(e¯i, s¯j) = e¯l|et = e¯i, ✏t = ✏¯j)⇡jm t(e¯i, ✏¯j).
The distribution   has dimensionality (#e ·#✏⇥1), where #e and #✏ respectively refer
to the number of grid points for employment and the idiosyncratic shock. In practise
the law of motion is set up by combining the policy functions and the law of motion
for the idiosyncratic state into a large transition matrix  , which has dimensionality
(#e ·#✏ ⇥#e ·#✏). This transition matrix   may vary for incumbents and entering
firms, since entrants are allowed to have a di↵erent initial transition matrix for the
idiosyncratic shock. The non-zeros in the row associated with e¯i, ✏¯j are then defined
as
 ((i  1) ·#✏ + j, ( e(i, j)  1) ·#✏+ 1 :  e(i, j) ·#✏) = ⇡✏(i, :) · (1   x(i, j)).
Then we can rewrite the law of motion for   as
 ˜1 =  ˜
0
0 ,
and the solution can be found by iteration or solving  ˜ =  ˜0 , where  ˜ is the eigen-
vector of   that is associated with its unitary eigenvalue.
In the presence of an aggregate shock the algorithm can obviously not be used to
compute a stationary distribution. But the same logic applies and a distribution  ,
which then has dimensionality (#e · #✏ · #A ⇥ 1) and a transition matrix   which
then has dimensionality (#e ·#✏ ·#A ⇥#e ·#✏ ·#A) can be set up. The simulation
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then consists of drawing a random sequence of realizations of the aggregate shock and
computing  ˜1 =  ˜00 . The code is available upon request.
A.4 Extensions (in progress)
Introducing Financial constraints for all firms I introduce a working-capital
assumption into the model. Firms have to pay a fraction   of their period expenses
at the beginning of the period. Those expenses include the wage bill w · e and ad-
justment costs, including the fixed cost. To finance those costs, firms borrow use
their housing value qh as collateral just like entrants in the benchmark model. For
any uncollateralized fraction of the loan the firm has to pay the higher interest rate
Rˆ   1. At the end of the period, once profits are realized, the entrepreneur pays back
the loan to the bank. I assume that an entrepreneur’s realization of " is perfectly
observable by the bank. This modification essentially makes qh a state variable of the
entrepreneur’s problem.
Results in progress...
Alternative wage setting To apply the Stole and Zwiebel (1996) framework I
assume that the agent’s utility function be linear, Z(c) = c. As in Elsby and Michaels
(2013) this is done to obtain a closed form solution for the problem. Details to follow.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
The appendix describes our method of solving the planner’s problem. The approach
taken for characterizing the law of motion for the joint distribution,  , is described in
the text. Here we focus on the planner’s choice of capital in the reallocation process.
Any vector of capital allocated across adjustable plants k(") will have associated
values for µa and  a. Create a grid for potential vectors k("). To do so, define
two benchmarks for the planners decision regarding the allocation of capital across
those plants that are in FA. Define kmax as the vector where marginal products are
equalized across plants. This vector was found in (2.9) for the frictionless benchmark
case above. In the presence of Calvo adjustment costs, the planner will not reallocate
more capital between plants than under the allocation rule kmax, but possibly less.
The second benchmark will be called kmin and is simply the case where capital is
equally distributed across adjustable plants (i.e. no reallocation). The idea behind
this procedure is that the planner will choose a vector k(") which is between kmax and
kmin, meaning that the planner will reallocate some capital between plants, but not
as much as under the frictionless benchmark. We consider convex combinations of
kmax and kmin.
Define a variable m, that takes values between zero and one and determines a
potential vector of k(")’s as follows: km = m · kmax + (1   m) · kmin. For each km
compute µm = E(km(")↵) and  m = Cov(", km(")↵) characterizing this vector. This
allows the calculation of output associated with m. The planner optimizes over m
and this translates into µm, m.
To check the robustness of this procedure start from a model with the baseline
parameters without any exogenous shocks. It turns out that the planner chooses
m = 0.9508, which means that the optimal vector k(") = 0.9508 · kmax+0.0492 · kmin,
so capital reallocation is about 5% lower compared to the frictionless benchmark. In
order to see how good of an approximation the decision rule ‘m’ is, we apply the
following procedure.
We work directly with the planner’s value of the steady state (SS) allocation. The
simplified version of the value function has only two states, µn and  n, so there will
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be a value V (µSSn , 
SS
n ) associated to the steady state. This value is equal to forever
receiving the output associated with the amount of reallocation ‘m’ times the fraction
of adjustable plants, plus the output associated with the SS state vector times the
fraction of non-adjustable plants.
V (µSS, SS) =
´
"2FA "k(")
↵f(")d" + (1  ⇡)(E(")µSS +  SS)
1    (10)
The planner can now choose any allocation of capital across plants. This allocation
implies a mapping into the values of µn and  n. The planner will be allowed to choose
the allocation that maximizes the expression for V (µSS, SS) above. Being bound to
the same grid, the resulting vector is identical to the one previously found. We now
perturb this vector in order to find profitable deviations that keep the aggregate
capital stock constant. The perturbation adds a random vector with mean zero to
the k-vector that maximized (27) given the grid. If the resulting vector produces a
higher lifetime utility, the k-vector is updated accordingly. This procedure is repeated
1,000,000 times. The results show that our grid for m comes extremely close to the
optimal solution. Although profitable deviations are possible, they remain very small:
the di↵erence in output is around 0.01%.
110
Appendix to Chapter 3
Parameter choices explained
Overtime premium   (1) ”As a general principle, in cases of overtime exceed-
ing maximum working hours, an employee is entitled to overtime premium pay. By
the application of a pay supplement it is usually at least 25 per cent higher than
the pay which the employee could have earned if the work had been done in normal
working time. Employees can claim overtime premium pay even if such overtime was
prohibited by statute or collective agreement. No entitlement exists if the overtime
exceeding statutory working hours is done to enable employees to catch up on work
that has not been done through their own fault.” (see eurofund). (2) Some collective
agreements and employment contracts provide for an increased payment for over-
time hours. Appropriate are 25 per cent on regular working days and 50 per cent
on Sundays and Holidays. (see Eichhorst, Wener ”Traditionelle Beschaeftigungsver-
haeltnisse im Wandel. Benchmarking Deutschland: Normalarbeitsverhaeltnisse auf
dem Rueckzug. table 8). (3) Hunt sets a similar parameter, which characterizes over-
time payment, to 0.25. (see page 136). (4) According to Burda and Hunt, additional
flexibility in terms of working hours (for instance time accounts) reduced the actual
overtime premium paid by firms significantly over the last years. (see footnote 18,
page 301).
Employer social security contribution rate   (1) ”Employers’ social contri-
butions are payments (either actual or imputed) by employers which are intended
to secure for their employees the entitlement to social benefits should certain events
occur, or certain circumstances exist, that may adversely a↵ect their employees’ in-
come or welfare - sickness, accidents, redundancy, retirement, etc.” Statistics from
the OECD suggest that employer social security contribution is around 20.6 per cent
of the gross wage. (2) An international comparison published by EUROSTAT shows
that the contribution rate is around 23 per cent. (3) On the contrary the German
statistics o ce DESTATIS calculates a rate which is 28 per cent. (4) More specifi-
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cally, this rate includes contributions to a wide range on insurance schemes: health
insurance (7.3 per cent), long term care (0.975 per cent), pension plans (9.8 per cent),
unemployment insurance (1.5 per cent), insurance against bankruptcy (0.04 pH).
Share of social contribution paid by firm in case of STW µ
Replacement rate for compensation lost due to hours reduction   ”The
calculation of the individual STC is just like the calculation of unemployment benefits:
for the lost working hours, employees with at least one dependent child receive a
compensation of 67 per cent of the net di↵erence to the regular wage, whereas those
without dependents get 60 per cent; for a loss of work of 100 per cent, the STC
has the same amount as the unemployment benefits.” (see Crimmann, Wiesner and
Bellmann (2010), page 19). The budget for partial unemployment is financed through
the government.
Table 5: Coe cients from a Panel-VAR on Hours growth and Employment growth.
Dependent variable in column.
x Dn Dhours Dn before 2003 Dhours before 2003 Dn after 2002 Dhours after 2002
L.Dn .15862217 .08074814 .14221813 .05946681 .16131513 .07616513
L.Dhours .01907817 -.00802338 .05100504 .07231959 .00310598 .01567351
Contracted hours h¯
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